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INTRODUCTION
L. HAMILTON LOWE*
One of the most frustrating experiences in the life of a Texas trial lawyer
occurs when he has to inform his client that although he has won his
case he will receive nothing but experience and a scrap of paper called a
judgment. After both client and lawyer have spent considerable time and
money preparing and trying a hotly contested lawsuit, after a jury has
returned a verdict in their favor, and after a judge has rendered judgment
on such verdict and decreed that the defendant must pay the plaintiff a
considerable sum of money, the lawyer is forced to tell his client that the
debt will not be satisfied because the defendant has succeeded in concealing
all of his assets and now owns only exempt property. The lawyer can
avoid this predicament, however, by investigating thoroughly the solvency
of the defendant in the early stages of litigation. If this is done, the lawyer
will be in a position to either take the steps necessary to impound the
non-exempt assets of the defendant so as to prevent their alienation or
disposal pending the outcome of the suit or tell his client in advance what
to expect even if he wins his case. In any event, the client will not be
nearly as dissatisfied as he will be if he gets a verdict and judgment, but
no money.
Post-judgment creditors' remedies, such as sequestration, garnishment and
receivership, were originally covered by creditors' bills in Texas. Through
subsequent statutory provisions, however, these specific remedies were
removed from the ambit of the creditors' bill.' The usefulness of the bill is
today limited severely because, by statutory definition, the creditors' bill is
2
designed to benefit a creditor who has exhausted all his remedies at law.
To invoke this equitable action a creditor must obtain a proper judgment
and establish his priority over other creditors.3 In addition, the bill will
operate on property such as intangibles, choses in action or contingent
interests which by reason of their nature only, and not by reason of any4
rule exempting them from liability for debts, cannot be subject to execution.
The effect of creditors' bills has been further delimited by a succession
of early decisions' culminating in the application of these bills to areas of
Attorney at law, Austin, Texas; LL.B., University of Texas.
1. Griffs, Creditors' Bills, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS 151-52 (J. McKnight
ed. 1963).
2. Id. at 151.
3. Comment, Creditors' Bills in Texas, 5 TEXAS L. REV. 263, 265 (1927).
4. Id. at 265.
5. See, e.g., Cargill v. Kountze Bros., 86 Tex. 386, 22 S.W. 1015 (1893); White
*
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fraud and trusts.6 These cases Were reviewed in Gulf National Bank v.
Bass7 where the plaintiff sought the appointment of a receiver to collect
and hold his claim and an injunction to prevent the defendant from making
an assignment of the claim. The court denied the plaintiff equitable relief,
stating that although the point had not been directly decided, it had become
settled that creditors' suits could be brought only in cases dealing with fraud
or trusts.8
Although the validity of the limitations in Bass remains unchallenged, 9
there is some indication that the outlook of the courts toward creditors'
bills may be changing. In Chander v. Welborn,10 a suit to try title to
realty conveyed by decedent to the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court of Texas
allowed the creditors to intervene to set aside the deed. The court stated
that "[e]quity will not suffer a right to be without a remedy.""
It was
recommended that an equitable action such as a creditor's bill should be
used to reach funds which justly belong to the estate so that they may be
distributed to the creditor. 12 Although this decision reflects a loosening of
the rigid application of the bill, its true effect remains to be seen. The limited
use of creditors' bills and their inapplicability in situations giving rise to the
statutory remedies discussed in this symposium account for the lack of
further references to this post-judgment remedy.
The decision as to whether or not a post-judgment remedy is available
without undue risk may be aided by the discovery rules. However, in cases
where these steps have not been taken prior to judgment, execution and
garnishment may have to be employed. It is with these post-judgment
remedies of garnishment and execution that this symposium is primarily
concerned and because the implementation of either proceeding is fraught
with opportunity for error, emphasis has been placed on the proper procedures to be followed and the possible pitfalls that may be encountered
in their use.
The writ of garnishment may be used immediately after judgment if the
proper requirements are present. Execution, on the other hand, may not
Sewing Mach. Co. v. Atkeson, 75 Tex. 330, 12 S.W. 812 (1889); Galveston H. & S.A.
Ry. v. Hume, 59 Tex. 47 (1883); Galveston H. & S.A. Ry. v. Butler, 56 Tex. 506
(1882); Taylor v. Gillean, 23 Tex. 508 (1859).
6. Griffs, Creditors' Bills, in CREDrrosS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS 152 (J. McKnight
ed. 1963). The series of statutes governing fraudulent conveyances has greatly defeated the use of the non-statutory creditors' bill in situations of fraud. Id.
7. 177 S.W. 1019 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1915, writ ref'd).
8. Id. at 1023.

9. Griffs, Creditors' Bills, in

CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS

154-55 (J. McKnight

ed. 1963).
10. 156 Tex. 312, 294 S.W.2d 801 (1956).
11. Id. at 319, 294 S.W.2d at 807.

12. Id. at 319, 294 S.W.2d at 807, quoting J.

POMEROY,

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

459 (5th ed. 1941).
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be employed until 20 days have elapsed after rendition of the judgment.
If the grounds for garnishment do not exist, then the creditor should wait
the 20 days to secure a writ of execution; otherwise, a wrongful garnishment
will occur. The risk of wrongful garnishment, however, may be minimized by using the discovery procedure available after judgment.
In addition to these procedural considerations, the symposium also sets
out the types of property which are exempt from both the writ of garnishment and levy of execution. In Texas, the exempt status given to homesteads and the proceeds of their sale, current wages, property in legal custody,
property held in trust, certain undivided interests, partnership funds and
assets, pledged or secured funds or property and others is appropriately
broad. The livelihood of the debtor and his family should not be unduly
jeopardized by creditors seeking to collect debts which have been induced by
over-salesmanship on the part of the creditor. It is for this reason, however,
that the attorney should be diligent in determining whether or not certain
types of property actually in the possession of the defendant are legally subject to seizure or impoundment.
Finally, the symposium presents the fundamental rules for invoking the
jurisdiction of the courts and for governing the proper application of the
venue statutes in the context of those particular devices which come into
play both offensively and defensively in the development of either postjudgment proceeding. Because the article discusses most of the questions
raised in these areas in depth, further elaboration at this point is unnecessary.
It is sufficient to say that a practicing lawyer will derive great benefit from
reading this student work.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss4/5

4

Symposium: Creditors' Post-Judgment Remedies in Texas.

THE GARNISHMENT PROCESS
An action in garnishment allows a debtor to satisfy his creditors with
goods, money, or credits which are owned directly to the debtor by a third
party.' The proceeding involves three major parties-the principal plaintiff
or garnishor, the principal defendant or debtor, and the garnishee, the individual in the possession of the debtor's property, money, or credits.
Garnishment has been characterized as a proceeding in rem because "the
garnishee is the receiver of the court to hold the res until it is determined
who is entitled to it ' 2 and as a form of attachment because it seizes the
effects of the defendant in the possession of the garnishee.3 The garnishment
action has also been described as ancillary in that it cannot be separated
from the original lawsuit between the principal plaintiff and defendant 4 and
as "inquisitorial" in that its purpose is to ascertain the facts 3 and determine
whether the garnishee, against whom the writ is issued, is indebted to or has
property belonging to the principal defendant in his possession. 6
Article 4076 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes provides for the issuance of the writ of garnishment on an original attachment, a due and unpaid debt, or in satisfaction of an existing judgment. 7 Although the basis for
1. Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 52, 106 S.W.2d 1039, 1042 (1937).
2. Buchanan v. A.B. Spencer Lumber Co., 134 S.W. 292, 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911,
no writ); accord, Foy v. East Dallas Bank, 28 S.W. 137, 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894,
no writ), citing Berry v. Davis, 77 Tex. 191, 13 S.W. 978 (1890).

Garnishment has also been characterized as having dual qualities, in personam and
inrem. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Hart, 321 S.W.2d 319, 320-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1959, writ ref'd).

3. Snyder Motor Co. v. Universal Credit Co., 199 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Fort Worth 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

4. King & King v. Porter, 113 Tex. 198, 200, 252 S.W. 1022 (1923); Texas Co.
v. Disney, 279 S.W. 280, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1925, writ ref'd); Note, 1
ST. MARY's L.J. 240, 241 (1969).
5. Jemison v. Scarborough, 56 Tex. 358, 361 (1882); McKesson & Robbins, Inc.
v. Southwestern Drug Corp., 165 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1942), rev'd
on other grounds, 141 Tex. 284, 172 S.W.2d 485 (1943).
6. Jemison v. Scarborough, 56 Tex. 358, 361 (1882); Smith v. Rogers, 147 S.W.2d
934, 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1941, no writ).
7. The statute in its entirety reads:

The clerks of the district and county courts and justices of the peace may issue

writs of garnishment, returnable to their respective courts, inthe following cases:

1. Where an original attachment has been issued.
2. Where the plaintiff sues for a debt and makes affidavit that such debt is just,
due and unpaid, and that the defendant has not within his knowledge property in
his possession within this State, subject to execution, sufficient to satisfy such debt;
and that the garnishment applied for is not sued out to injure either the defendant

or the garnishee.
3. Where the plaintiff has a valid, subsisting judgment and makes affidavit that

the defendant has not, within his knowledge, property in his possession within this
State, subject to execution sufficient to satisfy such judgment.
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the issuance of the writ may vary, the relationship of the parties involved
remains substantially unchanged. Since the garnishee has not violated any
of the provisions of his debt to the principal defendant and is not directly
indebted to the garnishing creditor, his liability to the garnishor is contingent8
upon the right of the principal defendant to maintain suit against him.
Upon final judgment, the garnishor applies the proceeds of the suit to the satisfaction of the debt or judgment owed to him by the debtor. 9 The amount
of the judgment awarded the garnishor, however, cannot exceed the debt
owed by the garnishee to the principal defendant or the property held by

the garnishee. 10

The garnishing party therefore acquires no greater right

against the garnishee for he "merely steps into the shoes of his debtor""
and has no authority to place the garnishee in a less favorable position than
12
he necessarily would occupy in a suit brought by the principal defendant.
The rights of third parties, such as those claiming the property to be garnished,
are not determined under the statute, nevertheless, it is well established
that such parties may "intervene or be interpleaded by the garnishee for
the purpose of having their rights determined."'
14
While case law generally establishes the relationship between the parties,
the rules and statutes narrowly define the procedures which must be followed to maintain a valid garnishment suit.' 5 The process is exclusively
Tax.

REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (1966).
The purpose of this paper is to explore
post-judgment remedies and will only deal with a writ of garnishment issued when
the plaintiff has a valid judgment.
8. Jemison v. Scarborough, 56 Tex. 358, 361 (1882); Pearson Grain Co. v. Plains
Trucking Co., 494 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Becker v. Cooper, 22 S.W.2d 1083, 1085 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1929, writ dism'd).
9. Becker v. Cooper, 22 S.W.2d 1083, 1085 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1929, writ
dism'd).
10. Mensing v. Engelke, 67 Tex. 532, 537, 4 S.W. 202, 204 (1887); Pace v. Pierson, 145 S.W.2d 929, 931-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1940, no writ); White v. Sibley, 59 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1933, writ dism'd).
11. Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 52, 106 S.W.2d 1039, 1042 (1937).
12. Iglehart v. Moore, 21 Tex. 501, 502 (1858); Pearson Grain Co. v. Plains
Trucking Co., 494 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
13. Staley, Langford & Chenault v. City Nat'l Bank, 253 S.W. 626, 628-29 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1923, no writ); Zimmerman Land & Irrigation Co. v. Rooney Mercantile Co., 195 S.W. 201, 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1917, writ ref'd); Reinertsen
v. E.W. Bennet & Sons, 185 S.W. 1027, 1029 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1916, writ
ref'd). See generally Note, 37 TExAs L. REV. 790 (1959).
14. See, e.g., Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 52, 106 S.W.2d 1039, 1042 (1937);
Jemison v. Scarborough, 56 Tex. 358, 361 (1882); Iglehart v. Moore, 21 Tex. 501,
502 (1858); Becker v. Cooper, 22 S.W.2d 1083, 108,5 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1929, writ
dism'd).
15. TEx. R. Civ. P. 657-679; Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4076, 4084, 4093,
4096, and 4099 (1966).
For cases stating that the above must be strictly followed see Jemison v. Scarborough, 56 Tex. 358, 361 (1882); Krieger v. Sheffield, Garrett & Carter, 341 S.W.2d 564,
566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hanson v. Guardian Trust Co., 150
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confined to these statutory constructions and the principles of equity have no
application in determining the outcome of the suit.16 Service of the writ
of garnishment attaches all goods of the defendant which are in garnishee's

possession at the time of service, 17 or "so owing at the time the garnishee
is required by the writ to appear and answer." 18 The garnishee will be
personally liable to the garnishing party if he attempts to return to the defendant or takes any other action which will jeopardize the position of the
garnishor after being served with the writ. 19 The writ notifies the garnishee
that he is liable for and must answer as to all assets and goods of the debtor
which are in his possession. 20 In responding to the writ, the garnishee may
assert any defense which is available to the principal defendant if the property were in his possession. 2' The garnishee is also required to plead any exemption applicable to the goods in question 22 and the garnishee may have
the principal defendant cited in the proceeding so that the defendant may
establish the exemption. 23 When the answer is filed, the garnishor may
controvert any allegations he believes in good faith to be incorrect. 24 If the
garnishee fails to answer the writ or makes an incomplete answer, judgS.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ dism'd); Buchanan v. A.B.
Spencer Lumber Co., 134 S.W.2d 292, 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-1911, no writ).
16. Hanson v. Guardian Trust Co., 150 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ dism'd); Smith v. Rogers, 147 S.W. 2d 934, 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1941, no writ).
17. Tax.R.Crv. P.669.
18. Jarecki Mfg. Co. v. Consolidated Gasoline Co., 129 Tex. 644, 648, 105 S.W.2d
663 (1937). The garnishee may answer before or after (if no default judgment has
been entered) the date specified in the writ but he cannot add to the indebtedness
owing the plaintiff by delaying his answer or subtract therefrom by answering early.
Id. at 650, 105 S.W.2d at 663.
19. Pure Oil Co. v. Walsh-Woldert Co., 36 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1931, writ dism'd); accord, Baughn v.J.B. McKee Co., 124 S.W. 732, 732-33
(Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ). In Baughn the court held that the garnishee could
not recover the amount of an indebtedness voluntarily paid to the principal defendant
after service of the writ because he had no legal obligation to do so and the law specifically prohibited him from making such payment. Baughn v. J.B. McKee Co., 124 S.W.
732, 732-33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ), citing Taylor v. Hall, 71 Tex. 213, 9 S.W.
141 (1888).
20. Hanson v.Guardian Trust Co., 150 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex.Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ dism'd).
21. Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 52, 106 S.W.2d 1039, 1042 (1937); Ellison v. Tuttle,
26 Tex. 283, 285 (1862).
22. Smith v. Security Inv. Co., 16 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1929,
no writ), citing Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Whipker, 77 Tex. 14, 13 S.W. 369 (1890). See
Baumgardner v. Southern Pac Co., 177 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1943,
no writ); J.M. Radford Co, v. McKean, 41 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1931, no writ).
23. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Whipker, 77 Tex. 14, 18, 13 S.W. 639, 640 (1890); Russell v. Hamilton, 174 S.W. 705, 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1915, no writ). See
generally Note, 37 TExAs L. REV. 790, 793 (1959).
24. Ellison v. Tuttle, 26 Tex. 283, 286 (1862); First Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 22
S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1929, no writ); TEx. R. Crv. P. 673.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 5 [2022], No. 4, Art. 5

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:715

ment may be entered against him. 25
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT

Property to be garnished under the writ of garnishment must be personalty and subject to seizure and sale by execution, for the writ will not
operate on real property. 26 Although personalty involves a wide spectrum,
the following represent types of personal property which have most often
been the subject of the writ.
Debts
A debt must be absolute and payable and independent of any contingency to be the proper subject of a garnishment action.2 7 Although a contingent contract may not be garnished, the Texas Supreme Court held in
Phenix Insurance Co. v. P. J. Willis & Bro.2s that the process may be levied on
the payment of which
a debt which is absolutely and unconditionally due but 29
occur.
to
certain
event
awaits the happening of a future
For a fund or liability to be garnished it must be liquidated, with both
the duty to pay and the amount due determined, at the time of the filing of
the garnishee's answer.30 The rationale of this principle was stated in
Hall v. Nunn Electric Co.,3 1 wherein the court stressed that the amount due
to state
must be determined so that the garnishee may fulfill his requirement
32
under oath precisely what he owes to the principal defendant.
Banking Transactions
Courts have held that funds in a bank deposit or account may be impounded under the writ irrespective of the name on the account. 33 In
25. Holloway Seed Co. v. City Nat. Bank, 92 Tex. 187, 190, 47 S.W. 95, 97 (1898);
TEX. R. Civ. P. 667.
26. Price v. Brady, 21 Tex. 614, 617 (1858); Fitzgerald v. Brown, Smith & Marsh
Bros., 283 S.W. 576, 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1926, writ dism'd); TEx. R. CIrv.
P. 672; Lowe, Collection of Debts By Extraordinary Proceedings: Attachment, Garnishment, Sequestration and Receivership, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS 234 (J. Mc-

Knight ed. 1963).
27. Clapper v. Petrucci, 497 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, no
writ); Saenger v. Proske, 232 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1950, no writ).
28. 70 Tex. 12, 6 S.W. 825 (1888).
29. Id. at 15-16, 6 S.W. at 829. In this case proceeds of an insurance policy due
for fire loss were held to be subject to garnishment after proper proof of the loss had
been filed.

Id. at 15-16, 6 S.W. at 829.

30. Alexander v. Berkman, 3 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927, writ
ref'd).
31. 183 S.W. 13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1916, writ ref'd).
32. Id. at 18.
33. Frankfurt's Texas Inv. Corp. v. Trinity Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 414 S.W.2d 190,
195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stevens v. Simmons, 61 S.W.2d
122, 125 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1933, no writ).
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Tatum State Bank v. Gibson,3 4 the name on the account was disregarded in

impounding community funds, but the court emphasized that there must be
sufficient proof alleged to show the funds on deposit were not the separate
property of one spouse.8 5
Banks have often been garnished by judgment creditors to procure the
contents of safety deposit boxes. The court allowed garnishment in Blanks
v. Radford36 holding that it was immaterial that the bank had no knowledge of the contents of the safety deposit box.8 7
Negotiable Instruments

Although a bank deposit may be garnished at any time, a negotiable
instrument 88 may not be garnished until it reaches maturity.
This rule
protects the maker of the note, who is indebted to the holder of the note at
maturity, from making double payment. 40 In an early Texas case,
Thompson v. Gainesville National Bank,4 1 the supreme court announced that
this exemption from garnishment action should be applicable only as long as
the reason for the rule exists. 4 2 Therefore, notes which are past due 43 or

non-negotiable 44 are always a proper subject for garnishment.
Shares of Stock

Rules 669 and 678 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have speci34. 24 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1930, no writ).
35. Id. at 507; accord, Ryals v. Garza, 264 S.W.2d 548, 550-51 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Taylor v. Suloch Oil Co., 141 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
36. 188 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
37. Id. at 886, quoting Trowbridge v. Spinning, 62 P. 125 (Wash. 1900).
38. See TEX. RaV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5932, § 1 (1962). This statute characterizes a negotiable note as a written and signed unconditional promise to pay a specified sum on demand or at a fixed time in the future.
39. lglehart v. Moore, 21 Tex. 501, 502 (1858).
40. Id. at 502-503.
41. 66 Tex. 156, 18 S.W. 350 (1886).
42. Id. at 158, 18 S.W. at 350-51.
43. Thompson v. Gainesville Nat'l Bank, 66 Tex. 156, 157, 18 S.W. 350 (1886);
Davis v. First Nat'l Bank, 135 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1939, no writ).
See generally Lowe, Collection of Debts By Extraordinary Proceedings: Attachment,
Garnishment, Sequestration and Receivership, in CREDITOR'S RIGHTs IN TExAs 237 (J.
McKnight ed. 1963).
Past due notes may be garnished because they "cannot be assigned to an innocent
party, free from those defenses which the maker could successfully set up in a suit
against him by the assignee." Thompson v. Gainesville Nat. Bank, 66 Tex. 156, 157,
18 S.W. 350 (1886).
44. Saenger v. Proske, 232 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1950, no
writ), citing Neal v. Kurz, 26 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1930, no writ);
Alexander v. Berkman, 3 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927, writ ref'd).
The reason for the rule fails here because these notes are not transferable by en-
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fically included shares of stock as property of the defendant that is subject
45
to garnishment. In discussing this provision, the court, in Nixon v. Nixon,
allowed the shares to be effectively impounded by an actual seizure of the
stock certificates in the possession of the garnishee.4 6 Seizure of the certi47
ficates is necessary to prevent other transfers of the same stock.
Trust Funds
A trust fund is generally not subject to garnishment. 48 It is well established, however, that a trust which does not contain express words of restraint, does not attempt to provide the beneficiary with support, and allows direct payments to the beneficiary with the right to use the income from
the trust as he wishes, may be properly subjected to the payment of the beneficiary's debts.4 9 If a spendthrift trust, in which the beneficiary is prohibited
from assigning his interests, 50 is in effect when the garnishment action is issued, the funds may not be reached by a creditor of the beneficiary. 51 The
spendthrift trust, however, is not totally immune from garnishment. The
court in Glass v. Carpenter52 held that where the settlor creates a trust
which makes himself the beneficiary, public policy will prohibit the protection of his funds or income therefrom against the valid claims of his own
creditors.5 3
Trust funds generally may not be garnished for the debts of an individual
trustee, 54 however, a trustee may become personally liabel for goods held
in trust which have been disposed of or converted to his private use.55
dorsement and delivery and, therefore, the maker of the note could not be required
to pay two persons.

45. 348 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
46. Id. at 437. See generally Lowe, Collection of Debts By Extraordinary Proceedings: Attachment, Garnishment, Sequestration and Receivership, in CREDITORS'
RIGHTS IN TEXAS 236 (J. McKnight ed. 1963).

47. Snyder Motor Co. v. Universal Credit Co., 199 S.W.2d 792, 797 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Fort Worth 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. Oglesby v. Durr, 173

S.W. 275, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1914, writ ref'd).

49. Nunn v. Titche-Goettinger Co., 245 S.W. 421, 422 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922,

jdgmt adopted).

50. Hines v. Sands, 312 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, no

writ), citing Long v. Long, 252 S.W.2d 235, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Texarkana 1952,

51. Id. Lindsey v. Rose, 175 S.W. 829, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1915, writ

ref'd).
52. 330 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App..--San Antonio 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. Id. at 533. This rule is applicable irrespective of the fraudulent intent of the

settlor or trustee. Id. at 533.

54. Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 52, 106 S.W.2d 1039, 1042 (1937); Belva Oil Co.
v. Lowe, 27 S.W.2d 599, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930, no writ); King & King
v. Porter, 229 S.W. 646, 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1921, no writ); Brown v. CassidyS.W. Comm'n Co., 225 S.W. 833, 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1920, no writ).
55. White v. Sibley, 59 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1933, writ
dism'd).
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PartnershipFunds

As a general rule, partnership funds are liable for the debts of the partnership.56 However, the principal plaintiff is prohibited from using the writ
of garnishment to garnish a partnership in order to collect a debt owed to
him by the principal defendant in his capacity as a partner. 57 The rationale
behind this exemption rests on the fact that the amount of the partner's interest can not be ascertained until final determination of all the partnership
accounts 58 and the statutory processes involved in garnishment are not
adapted to such equitable issues. 59 When the reason for the rule fails, however, the exemption becomes inapplicable.

For example, in Beggs v.

Brooker6 0 all the partners of a partnership were personally, jointly and severely liable on a note to the principal plaintiff. The court allowed garnishment of attorney's fees owing to the defendant stating that the individual

liability of all the partners made them liable just as if it were a partnership
debt. 61
Assignments

Property belonging to or an indebtedness owed to the principal defendant
which has been validity assigned by the garnishee prior to the service of the

writ may not be garnished, for the writ impounds only those funds actually
in the possession of the garnishee or an indebtedness owed by him at the
time of service. 62

63
This rule was held inapplicable in Hobbs v. Downing

64
where funds had been transferred for the purpose of defrauding creditors.
The Texas Business and Commerce Code makes an additional allowance for

56. See Gottesman v. Toubin, 353 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1962, no writ); Vassiliades v. Theophiles, 115 S.W.2d 1220, 1222 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1938, writ dism'd); Beggs v. Brooker, 79 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1934), afJ'd sub nom. Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937).
57. Gottesman v. Toubin, 353 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, no
writ); accord, Vassiliades v. Theophiles, 115 S.W.2d 1220, 1222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1938, writ dism'd); Beggs v. Brooker, 79 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1934), aff'd sub nom. Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937);
Belva Oil Co. v. Lowe, 27 S.W.2d 599, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930, no writ).
58. Beggs v. Brooker, 79 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1934),
aff'd sub nom. Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937); Brown v.
Cassidy-S.W. Comm'n Co., 225 S.W. 833, 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1920, no
writ).
59. Beggs v. Brooker, 79 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1934),
aff'd sub nom. Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937).
60. 79 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1934), aff'd sub nom. Beggs
v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937).
61. Id. at 644.
62. Saenger v. Proske, 232 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1950, no
writ); Amarillo Nat'l Bank v. Panhandle Tel. & Tel. Co., 169 S.W. 1091, 1092-93 (Tex.
Civ. App.- Amarillo 1914, no writ).
63. 147 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941, no writ).
64. Id. at 285-86, quoting Willis v. Yates, 12 S.W. 232 (Tex. Sup. 1889).
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the garnishment of some funds when both consenting and non-consenting
creditors are involved. 65
Pledged Property
Property of the principal defendant or debtor which has been promised or
pledged to a third party by the garnishee may be sold on execution against
the maker of the pledge. 66 In Waggoner v. Briggs67 money which was
pledged to sureties on a bail bond to secure them against liability was held
to be subject to garnishment contingent upon two factors: the garnishment action must not prejudice the rights of the pledgee and the conditions
of the pledge must be fully performed.6 8 In Waggoner the acquittal of the
defendant ended the agreement as to the pledged fund and the pledgeesureties had no further interest in it as a security for -the performance of the
bail bond.
Bailments
It is well established that property in the hands of a bailee may be subjected to seizure by garnishment for the debts of the bailor-debtor irrespective of the right of the bailor to reclaim his goods on demand. 69 The ability
70
of the creditor to reach such goods was delimited in Hearn v. Foster.
In that case bailed money, to be delivered to a third party on the happening
of a certain event, was held not subject to garnishment after the specific
occurrence had vested title in the third party. 71
Insurance Policies
Since a writ of garnishment may not be issued on a debt which is contingent and uncertain, 72 recovery of the proceeds of an insurance policy may
not be garnished until the principal defendant's rights have accrued. 73 Al65. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 23.33 (1968) provides:
If a creditor does not consent to an assignment, he may garnishee the assignee

for the excess of the assigned estate remaining in the assignee's possession after
the assignee has paid

(1) each consenting creditor the amount of his claim allowed under Section

23.31(b) of this code; and

(2) the expense of carrying out the assignment.
66. TEx. R. Civ. P. 643.
67. 166 S.W. 50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1914, no writ).
68. Id. at 52.
69. Hearn v. Foster, 21 Tex. 369, 370 (1858); McClung v. Watson, 165 S.W. 532,
535 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1914, no writ).
70. 21 Tex. 369 (1858).
71. Id. at 370.
72. Household Fin. Corp. v. Reyes, 408 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1966, writ dism'd); First Natl Bank v. Friend, 23 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1929, no writ).
73. Phenix Ins. Co. v. P.J. Willis & Bro., 70 Tex. 12, 15-16, 6 S.W. 825, 829
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though the performance of the contingent event firmly establishes the liability
of the insurance company,7 4 the proceeds still may not be garnished if the
policy was issued on exempt property. 75 This rule is illustrated by Chase v.
Swayne 76 wherein money paid on a policy covering a homestead was held not
to be subject to garnishment irrespective of the absolute liability of the company."7 The cash surrender value of a life insurance policy may also be
free from garnishment if the policy has been in effect for more than 2 years
and the members of the defendant's family are named as beneficiaries. 78
This statutory exemption applies only to that portion of the policy which
79
names the family as benficiaries.
Judgments
An outstanding judgment from a prior litigation which is owed by the
garnishee to the principal defendant may be garnished if the garnishee has
exhausted all of his remedies.8 0 In Dodson v. Warren Hardward Co.,"'
it was determined that a judgment must be final in the sense that it can be
neither set aside nor reversed on appeal.8 2 If the garnishment action is
brought in the same court in which the judgment is rendered, the court
automatically takes notice of the judgment and it, therefore, need not be
83
entered into evidence.
PROPERTY EXEMPTED FROM GARNISHMENT

Although certain types of personal property have been the subject of a
garnishment action, the Texas Legislature has exempted other specific forms
of personalty when seizure of the goods or money might work an undue
hardship on the defendant-debtor. These specific exemptions may be di(1888); Bauer v. Deike, 122 S.W.2d 1100, 1101 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1938, no
writ); First Nat'l Bank v. Friend, 23 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1929, no writ).

74.
75.
gan, 23
76.
77.

Phenix Ins. Co. v. P.J. Willis & Bro., 70 Tex. 12, 16 S.W. 825, 829 (1888).
Chase v. Swayne, 88 Tex. 218, 223, 30 S.W. 1049, 1051 (1895); Ward v. GogS.W. 479, 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).
88 Tex. 218, 30 .S.W 1049 (1895).
Id. at 222, 30 S.W. at 1050.
78. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a)(6) (Supp. 1974), formerly art. 3832a

(1966).
79. Id.

80. Alexander v. Berkman, 3 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927, writ

ref'd).
81. 162 S.W. 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1914), writ dism'd, 110 Tex. 576, 222
S.W. 157 (1920).
82. Id. at 954, quoting Waples-Plater Grocer Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 95 Tex.

486, 68 S.W. 265 (1902).

83. Although the presumption was inappropriate in the instant case, the court recognized it as a rule. Orleans Mfg. Co. v. Hinkley, 61 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Tex. Civ. App.
-- San Antonio 1933, writ dism'd).
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vided into five general categories: current wages, funds relating to realty,
public policy considerations, disability payments, and property under legal
custody.
Current Wages

The Texas Constitution and the Texas Civil Statutes prohibits the garnish-

ment of current wages. 8 4

Without proper protection a worker may be de-

prived of the necessary means to support himself and his family, he may be
forced to leave his job by an employer who dislikes any involvement in
garnishment proceedings, or he may voluntarily seek a bankruptcy action as the sole means of satisfying his debts.8 5 Although the various
states agree that the exemption of wages is generally supported by these three
arguments, 8 6 the significant diversity of exemptions throughout the nation
illustrates the difficulty at arriving at a fair solution for creditor and debtor
and may result in future statutory changes.

In Texas, this exemption specifically includes wages or salaries paid
periodically by an employer for personal services;8 7 however, it will not control as soon as the wages are due or have been paid to the employee.8 8 The
Texas Supreme Court applied this rule in Bell v Indian Live-Stock Co., 9

holding that wages left in the possession of the employer which had already
become due were not exempted and could be garnished. 90
Real Property

Although real property is not the proper subject of a garnishment action, a1 there are exemptions for funds which come from a sale of real prop84. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 28; TEX. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (1968).

Only

Florida and Maine join Texas in exempting all wages. Other criteria for wage exemptions are: (1) The amount needed to support the debtor's family; and (2) a fixed
amount or certain percentage of the wages. Most states exempt the greater sum-the
percentage or the fixed amount. For a complete listing of the state statutes governing
wage garnishment see Belsheim, Wage Garnishment in Nebraska, 51 NEB. L. REV. 63, 68
n.28-32 (1971). Federal policy on garnishment of wages is outlined in the Consumer
Credit Protection Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1970).
85. Belsheim, Wage Garnishmentin Nebraska, 51 NEB. L. REV. 63, 69-73 (1971).
86. Id. at 69.
87. Bell v. Indian Live-Stock Co., 11 S.W. 344, 346 (Tex. Sup. 1889); J.M. Radford
Grocery Co. v. McKean, 41 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1931, no writ);
Dempsey v. McKennell, 23 S.W. 525 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).
88. Bell v. Indian Live-Stock Co., 11 S.W. 344, 346 (Tex. Sup. 1889); Sutherland
v. Young, 292 S.W. 581, 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927, no writ); Note, 2 BAYLOR
L. REV. 390, 391 (1950). But see Lee v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co., 222
S.W. 283, 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1920, no writ) in which the court stated that
if a wage-earner is unable to collect his wages when they are due, "the exemption then
continues to such time when he can collect same in the exercise of ordinary diligence."
89. 11 S.W. 344 (Tex. Sup. 1889).
90. Id. at 346.
91. Cases cited note 26 supra.
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erty or buildings or improvements made on the land. The homestead of a
family has been protected by prohibiting an involuntary sale of the homestead for payment of debts. 92 Although garnishment would be ineffective
against a homestead because of its limitation to personalty, the proceeds of
a voluntary sale by a consenting owner have been exempted from garnishment within 6 months of the sale. 93 The court qualified this exemption
in Womack v. Stokes9 4 by holding that a note given on the purchase money
of a homestead is a proper subject for garnishment. 95
An ancillary exemption related to real property is found in article 5466
of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes which prohibits funds owing to a building contractor from being garnished by other creditors if the action would
in any manner jeopardize the right to payment of the subcontractors and
laborers involved in the construction. This statute protects the funds of subcontractors and laborers in an action by a principal plaintiff to garnish a contractor for debts owing to the defendant-debtor.
Public Policy
It has been held that public policy dictates that compensation to public
officials should not be garnished. 6 An early Texas case describes these public policy considerations by stating:
The public service is protected by protecting those engaged in performing public duties; and this not upon the ground of their private
interests, but upon that of the necessity of securing the efficiency of the
public service by seeing to it that the funds provided for its maintenance should be received by those who are to perform the work, at
such periods as the law had appointed for their payment. 97
This exemption is treated in a similar manner as the exemption for current
wages in that the court in Smith v. Bradshaw98 limited its effect by holding
that the exemption vanishes as the wages are paid or become due. 99
Public policy also dictates that a city may never be held as a garnishee
92. TEX. CoNsr. art. XVI, § 50; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3835 (Supp. 1974),

formerly art. 3832(1) (1966).

93. Graham Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 48 S.W.2d 358, 359 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1932, writ ref'd); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3834 (1966).
94. 35 S.W. 82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ).
95. Id. at 86.
96. Sanger v. Waco, 40 S.W. 549, 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, writ ref'd).
97. State Nat. Bank v. Fink, 86 Tex. 303, 305, 24 S.W. 256, 257 (1893), quoting Bliss v. Lawrence, 58 N.Y. 442, 444 (1874). The court went on to state that
depriving an official of his daily support might lead to dishonest actions or actions
detrimental to the public welfare. State Nat. Bank v. Fink, 86 Tex. 303, 306, 24 S.W.
256, 258 (1893).
98. 105 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ ref'd, 130 Tex. 180, 108 S.W.2d
200 (1937).
99. Id. at 341.
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and its funds may never be garnished. 10 0 The Texas Supreme Court also
applied this exemption to political subdivisions of the state performing governmental functions. 1 1 Retirement and annuity benefits of state employees 10 2 and pensions of firemen and policemen 03a are exempted as well as payments by the Municipal Retirement Board' 0 4 and the Teacher's Retirement

System. 105

Disability Benefits
Disability benefits have been held to be free from garnishment because
these payments are often the sole support of the disabled's family. For
this reason, the Workmen's Compensation Law provides that all compensation received under its provisions is to be exempt from garnishment. 10 6
Similar exemptions are accorded to disability compensation awarded by the
Highway Department' 0 7 and welfare assistance to the aged, blind, or dependent children.' 08
Property in the Custody of Law
The general rule that property in custodia legis is not subject to garnishment, was established to protect the courts from conflicts and invasions by
other tribunals.' 0 9 In Weeks v. Galveston Gas Co. 1 0 it was determined that
property in the custody of law encompasses all property in the hands of an
executor or administrator, thereby providing for the administration of decedents' estates in an orderly manner."' Funds in the hands of a clerk of the
court, 1 2 sheriff"13 and duly appointed receivers' 4 are not subject to garnish100. TEx.REv.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1175, § 5 (1963).
101. National Sur. Corp. v. Friendswood I.S.D., 433 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Tex. Sup.
1968).
102. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6228a, § 9 (1970).
103. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 6243, art. 6243a, § 16, art. 6243b, § 15, art.
6243d-1, § 17, art. 6243f, § 18, and art. 6243g, § 20 (1970).
104. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN._.art. 6235a-1, § 6 (1970).
105. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2922-1, § 16 and art. 2922-1f (1965).
106. TFx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (1967). One reason advanced for
the rule-to secure payments which are often the sole support of the family-was
stated in Note, 4 TEXAs L. REV. 538 (1926).
107. Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6674s, § 6 (1969).
108. TEx. REV.CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 695c, § 29 (1964).
109. Turner v. Gibson, 105 Tex. 488, 489-90, 151 S.W. 793 (1912); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. Watson, 413 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967,
no writ).
110. 54 S.W. 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ).
111. Id. at 620; accord, Pace v. Smith, 57 Tex. 555, 558 (1882); Huggins v. Phillips, 275 S.W. 1084, 1086 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1925, writ dism'd).
112. Pace v. Smith, 57 Tex. 555, 558 (1882); Lummus Cotton Gin Sales Co. v. Connerly, 30 S.W.2d 1112, 1114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1930, writ ref'd); Reid v.
Walsh, 63 S.W. 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no writ).
113. Pace v. Smith, 57 Tex. 555, 561 (1882); Challenge Co. v. Sartin, 260 S.W. 313,
314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1924, no writ).
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ment if they are held in an official capacity. This rule was limited by the
court in Pace v. Smith"1 5 which held the rule to be applicable only as long as
the reason for its exists and when nothing remains to be done but delivery of
is unimportant and
the property, protection from conflicts and interference
116
the property becomes a valid subject for garnishment.
The writ of garnishment was designed to remedy some of the inequities
and difficulties facing the judgment creditor in the satisfaction of his judgment. To insure, however, that the writ was not wrongfully or negligently
employed, the legislature established certain statutory rules which are absolute prerequisites to perfection of the writ. 11
PROCEEDINGS IN GARNISHMENT
Before the commencement of a garnishment proceeding, the garnishor
should insure that the garnishee has sufficient money or personal property of
the principal defendant in his possession to make the suit worthwhile. This
determination may ,be accomplished by a thorough investigation of the
principal defendant himself as well as the individuals, partnerships, and
corporations with whom he has dealt. Notwithstanding the fact that Texas
"has one of the most liberal, if not the most liberal, exemption statutes of
any state in the union," 8 there remains non-exempt property upon which
to obtain satisfaction. An attorney should remember, however, that under
Rule 677 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a garnishor must pay the
costs of suit plus reasonable attorney's fees to the garnishee if the suit is
lost. Consequently, the investigation process should continue until the attorney has "a reasonable likelihood of obtaining a favorable result."" 9
Perhaps the most effective method of obtaining current information concerning the financial status of the principal defendant is the discovery procedure.' 20 The pretrial discovery process permits the garnishor to inspect
114. Kreisle v. Campbell, 89 Tex. 104, 106, 33 S.W. 852, 853 (1896); Huggins v.
Phillips, 275 S.W. 1084, 1086 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1925, writ dism'd).
115. 57 Tex. 555 (1882).
116. Id. at 556.
117. "[A] garnishment suit is purely a statutory proceeding, and the provisions of
the statute are to be strictly construed." Jacksboro Nat'l Bank v. Signal Oil & Gas
Co., 482 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, no writ); accord, Beggs v.
Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937); Diamond Chem. Co. v. Sonoco Prods. Co.,
437 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ).
118. A. GOLDBERG, COLLECTION OF ACCOUNTS AND JUDGMENTS, TEXAS LAWYERS'
PRACTICE GUIDE, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IV-B-i, IV-B-2 (1967).
119. Id. at IV-B-5.
120. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-170. Rule 737 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
[T]he plaintiff shall have the right to have the defendant examined on oral interrogatories, either by summoning him to appear for examination before the trial
court as in ordinary trials, or by taking his oral deposition in accordance with the
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documents and records of the principal defendant prior to the main contest.
As an aid in the enforcement of judgments, Rule 621a provides for a similar procedure after judgment unless a supersedeas bond has been filed, or a
121
court order precludes such discovery.
CONDITIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT

The circumstances under which a writ of garnishment may be issued are
as follows:
The clerks of the district and county courts and justices of the peace
may issue writs of garnishment, returnable to their respective courts,
in the following cases:
1. Where an original attachment has been issued.
2. Where the plaintiff sues for a debt and makes affidavit that such
debt is just, due and unpaid, and that the defendant has not within his
knowledge property in his possession within this State, subject to execution, sufficient to satisfy such debt; and that the garnishment applied
for is not sued out to injure either the defendant or the garnishee.
3. Where the plaintiff has a valid, subsisting judgment and makes
affidavit that the defendant has not, within his knowledge, property in
his possession within
this State, subject to execution, sufficient to satisfy
122
such judgment.
Under subdivision 2, a garnishor may make application for the writ
123
before a final judgment has been entered against the principal defendant.
Alternatively, the garnishor may decide not to seek the writ until he has obtained a "valid, subsisting judgment."'1 24
general rules relating thereto.
This bill of recovery is a part of the main proceeding, not an independent suit. An
appeal may not be made as a separate cause based solely on the bill of discovery, but
it is reviewable by an appeal of the final judgment of the principal suit. Equitable
Trust Co. v. Jackson, 129 Tex. 2, 101 S.W.2d 552 (1937).
121. TEx. R. CIv. P. 621a. A discussion of the use of this discovery aid is found
at 770-72 infra.
122. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (1966).
123. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4076(2) (1966).

Recently, however, the con-

stitutionality of this subsection was brought into question. In Southwestern Warehouse
Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., Docket No. 902, Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], January 9, 1974 (not yet reported), the court held article 4084 unconstitutional to the extent that it failed to give the principal defendant notice and a hearing before it froze
his property then in the possession of the garnishee. Thus, article 4076(2), which
permits the plaintiff to obtain a writ before judgment in the original suit, would also
appear to be unconstitutional.
124. The better approach is to wait until after the final judgment. The reason is
two-fold; first, the validity of the garnishment proceeding is dependent upon final judgment so that one may still have to wait for the judgment before the writ is issued.
Secondly, because garnishment is an ancillary proceeding, if the main suit ends in a
verdict for the principal defendant, the garnishment action will be quashed.
This approach may become mandatory in Texas. The Houston Court of Civil Appeals
has held that the retention of the principal defendant's property before a final judgment
has been rendered against him, is a violation of due process except in extraordinary
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Jurisdiction in garnishment litigation is conferred upon the justice, county
and district courts. 125 Because the garnishment suit is ancillary to the principal case, both actions should be brought in the same court. 1 26 A judgment given in the original suit by a court without proper jurisdiction over
the amount or subject matter in controversy is void 27 and will result in
the ancillary proceeding also being considered invalid. 1 28 Furthermore, if
the court was without jurisdiction, it is immaterial that the parties consented
to have the case heard, 1 29 or that the issue of jurisdiction was not raised on
appeal; 1 0 in each of these circumstances the original suit will be void. The
case of Murray v. Brisco"3' offers a good example of the second proposition. In Murray, the garnishor had obtained a judgment against the principal defendant in the 56th Judicial District Court in Galveston. He then
initiated garnishment proceedings in the 10th Judicial District Court also located in Galveston. On appeal from a judgment refusing to quash the garnishment writ, the issue of jurisdiction was not raised. The court in holding
the original suit void, however, stated that the courts of civil appeals "have
the authority and duty to consider fundamental error apparent upon the
fact of the record though not assigned .... ",132
Venue for the principal suit is controlling and therefore, the garnishment
action is subject to the general venue provisions applied to other civil
cases." 33 When the garnishee is not a foreign corporation or is an individual
situations. Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., Docket No. 902, Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], January 9, 1974 (not yet reported).
An additional consideration is the possibility that the garnishor may be found liable
for damages to the garnishee for wrongful garnishment. Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Teas,
138 S.W.2d 637, 640-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940), aff'd, 138 Tex. 301,
158 S.W.2d 758 (1942). See generally Jarvis, Creditor'sLiability in Texas for Wrongful
Attachment, Garnishment, or Execution, 41 TExAs L. REv. 692 (1963).
125. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.art. 4076 (1966).

126. King & King v. Porter, 113 Tex. 198, 252 S.W. 1022 (1923); Buie-Crawford
Co. v. Cleburne Nat. Bank, 111 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1937, no writ).
127. Kelly v. Gibbs, 84 Tex. 143, 19 S.W. 563 (1892); Lopez v. Mexico-Texas Petroline & Asphalt Co., 281 S.W. 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1926, no writ);
Nesom v. City Nat. Bank, 174 S.W. 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1915, no writ).
128. Lopez v. Mexico-Texas Petroline & Asphalt Co., 281 S.W. 326 (Tex. Civ. App.
-San Antonio 1926, no writ) where the court said:
As the original judgment has been held to be erroneous as it is, and because it
is made the basis of the garnishment, it must follow, as logically as "night follows
day," that it cannot stand alone and must take the same route as the main case.
Id. at 327.
129. Harvey v. Wichita Nat. Bank, 113 S.W.2d 1022 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1938, no writ).
130. Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979 (1947) where the Texas
Supreme Court held that any error which was "fundamental error" could be reviewed
on appeal notwithstanding that it had not been assigned as error. Id. at 203, 205 S.W.
2d at 983.
131. 209 S.W.2d 976 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1948, no writ).
132. Id. at 977. For other problems arising from lack of jurisdiction in garnishment proceedings, see Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 1093 (1955).
133. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (1964).
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who is not a resident of the county where the principal suit is maintained,
18 4
the case may be tranferred to the county of the garnishee's residence.
This article, however, is limited to those cases where the garnishor has controverted the garnishee's answer. 135 When the cause has been transferred,
the garnishor has an affirmative duty to file a copy of the original judgment, his application for the writ, the answer of the garnishee and the affidavit controverting the answer in the court to which the action is trans136
ferred.
Because more than one person may have an interest in the garnished property, the parties to both the principal suit and the garnishment proceeding
may be designated as either necessary or proper. In the main suit, those
parties whose rights will be directly affected by the judgment are deemed to
be necessary parties. In the garnishment action, the garnishor and garnishee
usually compromise the only necessary parties. 13 7 The principal defendant is
not, under most circumstances, a necessary party. 13s This fact, however,
does not prevent him from asserting any defenses which may exist between
himself and the garnishor," s9 nor does it preclude him from appealing an adverse judgment. 140 In those cases where the principal defendant has filed a
142
replevy bond, 141 he does become a party to the proceeding.
The proper parties to the garnishment action, on the other hand, may
include anyone claiming an interest in the garnished property. 43 It then
134. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.

art. 4096 (1966).

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Whipker, 77 Tex. 14, 13 S.W. 639 (1890). The United
States Supreme Court in the case of Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969), however, held that the failure to give the principal defendant a hearing or
notice prior to time of the taking of the garnished property constituted a deprivation
of "due process" except in extraordinary situations. Id. at 339. It would appear to
be the better practice to have the principal defendant served in a prejudgment garnishment action to insure that the constitutional ramifications may be avoided. See Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., Docket No. 902, Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.], January 9, 1974 (not yet reported).
138. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Whipker, 77 Tex. 14, 15, 13 S.W. 639 (1890).

Where

a husband or a wife was the defendant in the main suit, however, and there is property involved, both husband and wife may become necessary parties to the garnishment
action. First Nat'l Bank v. Cole, 264 S.W. 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1924, no writ).
139. Gray Co. v. Ward. 145 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1940, writ
dism'd jdgmt cor.).
140. Phillips v. Interstate Securities Co., 250 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1952, no writ).
141. TEX. R. Civ. P. 664. A discussion of the replevy bond is found at 742-43 infra.
142. Griswold v. Tarbell, 242 S.W. 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, writ
dism'd).

143, F.C. Crane Co. v. Chas. C. Bellar Co., 135 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1939, no writ) where the court stated:
All parties having or claiming an interest in the debt or property due or held by

the garnishee should be made parties to the garnishment proceedings, in order that
the judgment obtained against the garnishee may be a complete defense in his be-
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becomes important for the garnishee to implead any claimants to the property
in order that his legal obligations can be ascertained. If the garnishee makes
payment to the garnishor and it is later determined that a third party had
superior rights to the funds or property in question, the garnishee may be sub44
ject to dual liability.1
APPLICATION FOR THE WRIT

Rule 658 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure states that prior to the
issuance of the writ:
[T]he plaintiff shall make application therefor, signed by him, stating
the facts authorizing the issuance of the writ, and that the plaintiff has
reason to believe and does believe, that the garnishee, stating his name
and residence, is indebted to the defendant, or that he has in his hands
effects belonging to the defendant.
The garnishor is required, by means of an affidavit, to provide sufficient
facts to authorize the issuance of the writ. The facts called for are dependent upon the particular basis for which the writ is sought. For example,
where the writ seeks to obtain satisfaction of a debt, the garnishor must state
that the debt is "just, due and unpaid."'1 45 Additionally, the garnishor must
allege that he believes that the principal defendant has insufficient property
within the state to satisfy the debt, and finally, he must swear that the garnishment suit was not instituted with the intent to injure the garnishee.1 40
When the basis of the writ is a judgment,' 47 the garnishor's affidavit
should provide that a valid and subsisting judgment has 'been rendered, and
that there is insufficient property of the principal defendant subject to execution to secure full satisfaction of the amount of the given judgment.
Once the application for the writ has been filed, the garnishor usually may
not amend the affidavit.' 48 Omission of one of the statutory requirements,
half to subsequent actions to recover the same debt or property.
Id. at 169.
144. Thompson v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 155 Tex. 365, 286 S.W.2d 411
(1956). Therefore, the garnishee should "pay the funds into the court and by interpleader bring into the suit all other claimants thereto in order to protect itself against
double liability." Id. at 371-72, 286 S.W.2d at 414. See also Liverpool & London
& Globe Ins. Co. v. Lummus Cotton Gin Sales Co., 6 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1928, jdgmt adopted); Hendrick v. Johnston, 32 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1930, no writ).

145. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4076(2) (1966). It may further be a necessity
that valid judgment be obtained against the principal defendant before the writ can
be issued under this provision. See Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc.,
Docket No. 902, Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], January 9, 1974 (not yet reported).

146. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANr. art. 4076(2) (1966).
147. TEx. REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4076(3) (1966).
148. East & W. Tex. Lumber Co. v. Warren & Son, 78 Tex. 318, 320, 14 S.W. 783,
786 (1890); Abadie v. Gaylor Oil Co., 129 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939, no writ).
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however, will not necessarily invalidate the proceedings if there was substantial compliance. 149 The majority of Texas court decisions have taken a
strict view as to what constitutes substantial compliance. For example, in
Gottesman v. Toubin, 150 the court stated that a writ of garnishment could be
quashed where the garnishor failed to allege that the principal defendant did
not have sufficient property subject to execution to satisfy the debt.' 5 ' A recent addition to the Rules of Civil Procedure may grant relief for minor de-

fects. Rule 679 provides that:
Clerical errors in the affidavit, bond or writ of garnishment or the

officer's return thereof, may . . . (upon application in writing to the
court) be amended . . . provided such amendment appears to the
judge. . . to be in furtherance of justice.
THE GARNISHMENT BOND

When the garnishor applies for the writ of garnishment based upon a debt

not yet reduced to judgment, Rule 658a requires that the garnishor execute
a bond as a conditon precedent to obtaining the writ. The bond must
be made payable to the garnishee in an amount double that claimed in the

writ as being owed.

It may be reduced to an amount double that stated in

the garnishee's answer, if the answer is not controverted.' 5 2 The bond must
be supported by two or more sureties who may be held jointly and severally
liable for any damages.' 53 The sureties may not attempt to be held jointly

liable. The right of contribution exists, however, for any judgment rendered
149. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. First Nat'l Bank, 84 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Fort Worth 1935, writ dism'd). TEx. R. Civ. P. 679 provides that mere clerical errors may be amended so long as "such amendment appears to the judge or justice to
be in furtherance of justice." See also South Fort Worth State Bank v, Howe, 361
S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, no writ) (omission of number and
style of the judgment rendered against principal defendant held clerical); First Nat'l
Bank v. Pacific Cotton Agency, 329 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1959,
no writ) (failure of affidavit to state the capacity of the garnishor to bring suit held
not fatal); Smith v. Miller, 298 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1957,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (fact that one of garnishors did not sign bond until 18 days after
filing was clerical error and could be waived); Mundy & Co. v. Houston Bank & Trust
Co., 254 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1953, no writ) (omission of the
word "just" held merely clerical).
150. 353 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, no writ).
151. Id. at 295-96, citing Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937);
Buerger v. Wells, 110 Tex. 566, 222 S.W. 151 (1920); Smith v. City Nat'l Bank, 140
S.W. 1145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1911, writ ref'd).
152. TEx. R. Civ. P. 658a. Only one bond is necessary, irrespective of the number
of garnishees, if there is only one garnishment suit. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Warnell, 103 S.W. 690, 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, writ ref'd).
153. Tax. R. Civ. P. 658a; Commonwealth v. United N. & S. Dev. Co., 140 Tex.
417, 422, 168 S.W.2d 226, 229 (1942) where the court held that a bond supported
by six corporate sureties which were designated as "several" but not "joint" sureties
was not sufficient to satisfy the statute and the writ of garnishment should be quashed.
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against them as sureties.' 5 4

When the bond is filed, the officer of the court

is charged with approving or disapproving it, but he has no authority to accept a bond which fails to satisfy the strict requirements of the statute.155
A bond which fails to meet these requirements does not render the proceedings void, but only voidable. The garnishee must assert any objection
in a motion to quash or a plea in abatement and the failure to do so may
constitute a waiver. 156
The purpose of the bond is to protect the garnishee from false claims or
wrongful garnishment. A garnishment is considered wrongful "if the facts
set forth in the garnishor's affidavit . . . are untrue . . . or if the debt
or judgment alleged to be the basis for the issuance of the garnishment be

non-existent or legally insufficient to support the writ."1 57

When wrongful

garnishment is found, the garnishee is permitted to recover actual damages 158 with exemplary damages allowed when the garnishment was sought

maliciously and without probable cause. 15 9

SERVICE OF THE WRIT

When all of the above requirements have been completed, "the judge, or
clerk, or justice of the peace . . . shall docket the case . . . and shall im.. ,60
mediately issue a writ of garnishment directed to the garnishee ..
154. See generally First Nat'l Bank v. Roberts, 286 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1956, no writ); cf. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 34.04 (1968).
155. Commonwealth v. United N. & S. Dev. Co., 140 Tex. 417, 421-22, 168 S.W.2d
226, 229 (1942). If the error was clerical, it would appear Rule 679 may be applied.
E.g., in Modern Dairy & Creamery Co. v. Blanke & Hank Supply Co., 116 S.W. 154,
155 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1909, no writ) the court held that where the writ
was delivered stating a bond in an amount 30 cents less than double the amount
named in the writ, the suit could not be quashed because of the principle of de minimis.
156. Smith v. Miller, 298 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1957, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
157. Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Teas, 138 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1940), aff'd, 138 Tex. 301, 158 S.W.2d 758 (1942). See also Sayeg v. Federal Mort. Co., 54 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1932, no writ); Foster v. Bennett, 152 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1912, no writ).
158. O'Hara v. Ferguson Mack Truck Co., 373 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Jarvis, Creditor's Liability in Texas for
Wrongful Attachment, Garnishment, or Execution, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 692 (1963).

159. Both elements, malice and lack of probable cause, must exist before exemplary
damages may be awarded. Ware v. Paxton, 359 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex. Sup. 1962);
O'Hara v. Ferguson Mack Truck Co., 373 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Woodward v. Tatum, 277 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1955, no writ); Thomas v. Callaway, 251 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. Civ. App.
-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. TEx. R. Civ. P. 659. Although there is no "due process" problem with this
rule in regards to post-judgment garnishment, its relation to prejudgment garnishment
was noted in a recent court of civil appeals case:
The rules of civil procedure which outline the process of prejudgment garnishment
are constitutionally defective in several respects. Rule 659 provides that the writ
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The writ should be directed to the garnishee in his individual capacity and
state the name of the principal defendant. The writ is then delivered to the
sheriff or constable who serves it upon the garnishee.161 The sufficiency
of the delivery as well as the return of the writ is determined by the same
judicial criteria applied in other civil cases. 162 For example, in Jacksboro
National Bank v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 163 the court refused to enforce a deserfault judgment where the sheriff's return did not show the place of the
64
vice and failed to state that the writ of garnishment had been executed.'
THE GARNISHEE'S ANSWER

When the garnishee receives the writ, he must satisfy two requirements.
First, the garnishee must appear on or before the Monday following the expiration of 20 days from the date of service (10 days if issued from a justice court).' 65 The writ must affirmatively specify the time and place of
appearance or else a default judgment rendered thereon will be open to at-

tack. 1 66 Second, the garnishee must file an answer, which must include a
response to four separate interrogatories:
indebted to the principal defendant
1) whether the garnishee was
1 67
at the time the writ was served;
shall issue at the same time the garnishment proceeding is docketed and that the
writ be directed only to the garnishee rather than to the defendant.
Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., Docket No. 902, Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.], January 9, 1974 (not yet reported). This fails to give a defendant a hearing or notice prior to his property being taken and is therefore unconstitutional. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
161. TEx. R. Civ. P. 663.
162. TEx. R. Civ. P. 663. See Fleming-Stitzer Road Bldg. Co. v. H.C. Rominges &
Co., 250 S.W. 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1923, no writ). The requirements of service have been narrowly construed. See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Watson, 436
S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texaco, Inc. v. McEwen,
356 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
163. 482 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, no writ).
164. Id. at 341-42; accord, Carlson Boat Works v. Hauck, 459 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ); Watson Van & Storage Co. v.
Busse, 451 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ); Diamond
Chem. Co. v. Sonoco Prods. Co., 437 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968,
no writ); Hyltin-Manor Funeral Home, Inc. v. Hill, 304 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.
San Antonio 1957, no writ).
165. TEx. R. Civ. P. 121 provides: "An answer shall constitute an appearance of
the defendant so as to dispense with the necessity for the issuance or service of citation
upon him." This does not prevent a garnishee from a foreign state from filing a special appearance. Tax. R. Civ. P. 120a.
166. Hanson v. Guardian Trust Co., 150 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1941, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Griswold v. Tarbell, 242 S.W. 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, writ dism'd w.o.j.). If the garnishee does appear, however, it will waive
the defect in the writ. Also, where a garnishee fails to make an objection to the defect
in the writ, it will constitute a waiver. Griswold v. Tarbell, 242 S.W. 324 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1922, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
167. The wording of Rule 659 is "The writ shall command the garnishee to answer
. . . what, if anything, he is indebted to the defendant .
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2) what effects of the principal defendant did the garnishee have
when the writ was served;
3) whether the garnishee has knowledge of any other persons who
are indebted to the principal defendant;
4) whether the garnishee has knowledge of any other persons who
have in their possession effects of the principal defendant. 1 8
The garnishee is further required to answer "under oath, in writing, and
signed by him," and that his answers be truthful. 169
Upon the service of the writ the garnishee may then be held liable for
the funds or effects in his possession. 170 Until that time the garnishee is
not deemed to have notice of the garnishment suit and may deliver the funds
or effects to the principal defendant before proper service in order to relieve
himself of the liability. In Pearson Grain Co. v. Plains Trucking Co.,' 7 1 for
example, the court concluded that delivery of a check owing to the defendant prior to service of the writ would defeat the garnishment suit. Once
delivery has been accomplished, the foundation of the suit had been disposed of and the writ must be dismissed.1 7 2 Upon service, however, the
garnishee is liable not only for those funds in his possession at that time, but
173
also for all funds or effects received by him until the time of his answer.
phrase "what, if anything" has been construed to include not only if he is indebted
to the principal defendant, but also in what amount. Burkett v. Gleney, 371 S.W.2d
412, 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
168. TEx. R. Civ. P. 659. An answer which fails to answer these questions is defective. For example, an answer that attempts to be evasive by not disclosing whether
or not the garnishee had any property of the principal defendant or was indebted to
him has been held sufficient to obtain jurisdiction over the garnishee, but defective as
an answer. Oklahoma Petro. Gas. Co. v. Nolan, 253 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1923, writ ref'd).
169. Tax. R. Civ. P. 665. If the answer is not sworn to, the garnishee should be
given an opportunity to amend "under the spirit . . . of the garnishment statutes." Durfee Mineral Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 236 S.W. 516, 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1921,
writ dism'd). See also Tax. R. Civ. P. 679.
170. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4084 (1966) recites: "From and after the service of such writ of garnishment, it shall not be lawful for the garnishee to pay to
the defendant any debt or to deliver to him any effects .... ." A "good faith" transfer
of the goods will not provide a defense, therefore, a garnishee who transfers any property after service does so at his peril. Westridge Villa Apartments v. Lakewood Bank
& Trust Co., 438 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Pure Oil Co. v. Walsh-Woldert Motor Co., 36 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1931, writ dism'd). The writ of garnishment can subject the garnishee to
liability only for property in his possession at the time of service. Adams v. Williams,
112 Tex. 469, 248 S.W. 673 (1923); First Nat'l Bank v. Lampman, 442 S.W.2d 858
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see First Nat'l Bank v. Banco
Longoria, 356 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
171. 494 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
172. Id. at 642.
173. First Nat'l Bank v. Banco Longoria, 356 S.W.2d 192, 195-96 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cooper v. Cocke, 145 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1940, no writ); Planters' & Mechanics' Bank v. Floeck, 43 S.W. 589
(Tex. Civ. App. 1897, writ ref'd).
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What would happen, however, if the garnishee, realizing that more funds of
the principal defendant will be arriving shortly, files his answer immediately
after service to avoid the increased liability?

The court in First National

Bank v. Banco Longoria,1 74 provided the garnishor with a remedy: if the
garnishor has reason to believe that the garnishee will receive more funds
before the time to answer, he may except to the answer and ask the court

to require that the garnishee answer fully. 175 Such a motion by the garnishor
does not constitute a denial of the answer. 17 6 The above rules have been
applied in Texas to both prejudgment and post-judgment garnishment.
On January 9, 1974, however, the Houston Court of Civil Appeals held

that in cases arising out of a debt (prejudgment), the garnishee's inability
to return property to the principal defendant after the writ is served,
deprived the defendant of property without due process of law and was
1 77
therefore unconstitutional.
The requirement in the garnishee's answer that he inform the court of any
other persons within his knowledge who are indebted to the principal defendant has been the subject of criticism.178 The critics contend that it
makes an informer of the garnishee and also that it is virtually impossible
to determine if he is telling the truth.'

79

If the garnishee fails to answer this

inquiry, it will not make his answer insufficient unless the garnishor takes
174. 356 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
175. Id. at 196.
176. Gray v. Armour & Co., 129 Tex. 512, 104 S.W.2d 486 (1937).
177. Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., Docket No. 902, Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.], January 9, 1974 (not yet reported). The court limited
its decision to only one statute, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4084 (1966) when
it concluded: "Article 4084, which freezes property after the writ of garnishment is
served, is thus the only statute or article here examined which is unconstitutional, and
only to the extent that it freezes property without notice and hearing before judgment
on the original claim." Id. at 5-6. Earlier statements made by the court leave in
doubt other statutes as well as some rules of civil procedure. For example, TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4076(2) (1966) and TEX. R. Civ. P. 659, 664, 668. The court
cited as authority Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) and Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) and the Texas decision is certainly in line with these cases.
The court added, however, that a prejudgment remedy which failed to provide notice
and a hearing before a taking of property was not unconstitutional if an "extraordinary
situation" was presented. For example, if it involved "an important governmental or
general public interest," or there was "a special need for very prompt action," or
where the state needed to keep "strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force."
Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., Docket No. 902, Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.], January 9, 1974 (not yet reported).
178. See, e.g., Lowe, Collection of Debts by Extraordinary Proceedings: Attachment, Garnishment, Sequestration and Receivership, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS 242
(J. McKnight ed. 1963).
179. If the garnishee fails to respond to a portion of this inquiry, the garnishee's
answer may still be sufficient. Gray v. Armour & Co., 129 Tex. 512, 515, 104 S.W. 2d
486, 487 (1937).
Other courts, however, have reasoned that an incomplete answer
is no answer and have rendered judgments against the garnishee. Freeman v. Miller,
51 Tex. 443 (1879); Norton v. B. & A. Drilling Co., 34 S.W.2d 1095 (Tex. Comm'n
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exception.' 8 0 In such a case, the garnishee should be given an opportunity
to amend."8"
Once the garnishee has filed his answer, one of three situations may occur: (1) The garnishee will be discharged; 8 2 (2) he will be judged in84
83
debted to the garnishor for a certain amount' or for certain effects;1
(3) or the garnishor will controvert the answer.' 85 If the garnishee claims
that he is not indebted to the principal defendant, nor in possession of any
effects of the defendant, Rule 666 provides that the garnishee shall be discharged and the suit dismissed.' 86 Because he has no funds of the principal defendant in his possession, there can be no liability. If the garnishor
believes that the answer is not true or is not complete, he may controvert
this answer, thus preventing such a discharge.' 8 7 If the answer admits an
indebtedness, the court may give judgment for the garnishor in the amount
so admitted or found by the court to be owing. If the judgment rendered in
the primary suit is for a lesser sum than that alleged in the garnishee's
88
answer, the court will decrease the garnishee's liability accordingly.1
A garnishor who is not satisfied with any portion of the answer may file
a controverting plea known as a traverse which may be filed at any time before the taking of a default judgment. 8 9 By traverse, a garnishor states that
"he has good reason to believe and does believe that the answer of the
garnishee is incorrect."' 9 0 The affidavit must specify the particular grounds
on which he is contesting. The purpose of the traverse is to establish the
precise issues upon which the parties :are in disagreement in order to permit the court to make a final determination. Consequently, where the
answer adequately specifies the controversies to be decided, a traverse is unApp. 1931, jdgmt adopted); Kentucky Oil Corp. v. David, 285 S.W. 290 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1926, jdgmt adopted).
180. First Nat'l Bank v. Banco Longoria, 356 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-San

Antonio 1962, writ ref'd
181. Gray v. Armour
182. Tax. R. Civ. P.
183. TEx. R. Civ. P.
184. TEx. R. Civ. P.

n.r.e.).
& Co., 129 Tex. 512, 104 S.W.2d 486 (1937).
666.
668.
669.

185. Tax. R. Civ. P. 673.
186. See also Goodson v. Carr, 428 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th

Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The garnishor has the burden to prove facts demon-

strating the contrary. Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Carmony, 62 S.W.2d 1115, 1117 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1933, no writ).

187. Tax. R. Civ. P. 673. Where no controverting affidavit is filed, and the garnishee denies that he is indebted, a default judgment rendered in favor of the garnishor
is void and the garnishee must be discharged. Pinkston v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co.,
215 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1948, no writ).
188. Tax. R. CIv. P. 668.
189. First Nat'l Bank v. Foley, 26 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1930, writ
ref'd).
190. TEx. R. Civ. P. 673. See also Industry State Bank v. Wylie, 493 S.W.2d 293

(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ).
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necessary. 191
DEBTOR'S RIGHT TO REPLEVY

In some instances, the principal defendant may ask that the effects held
by the garnishee be returned and not subjected to the garnishment proceeding. If the garnishee should return the property after receiving the
garnishment writ, however, he will remain liable for the value of the property possessed by him from the date of service until the time of answer.
Rule 664 provides for the replevy bond-a means whereby the principal
defendant may reacquire his property without the garnishee incurring the liability. The requirements necessary to effect the bond are similar to those
required of the garnishor in the garnishment bond. The principal defendand must supply two or more sureties who will be bound jointly and severally for any sum rendered against the defendant. The bond must be made
payable to the garnishor in a sum equal to twice the amount claimed in the
writ. Whereas the garnishment bond offers protection to the garnishee for
wrongful garnishment, the replevy bond insures that the amount of the judgIt may be filed at any time before judgment in the
ment will be satisfied. 192
garnishment proceeding.
By filing a replevy bond, the principal defendant has not waived any right
to defend or attack the proceedings in the main case. 109 The filing of a
bond, however, may constitute an appearance which will waive all nonjurisdictional defects.' 94 After the property has been replevied, the principal
defendant is estopped to deny any allegations concerning the ownership of
the property,' 9 5 or that he was the defendant in the principal case.' 96 Only
97
the principal defendant, however, may take advantage of the bond.'
When a valid bond is filed, the garnishee is relieved of any liability and
191. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Foley, 26 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1930, writ ref'd).
192. TEx. R. Civ. P. 664.
193. Cleveland v. San Antonio Bldg. & Loan Assn., 148 Tex. 211, 223 S.W.2d 226
(1949) holding that Rule 664 does not limit defendant's right to quash the writ, but
merely emphasizes that if he files a replevy bond, he still may assert any defenses.
See First Nat'l Bank v. Davidson, 67 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1934, writ
dism'd); First Nat'l Bank v. Guinn, 57 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933,
no writ). Contra, Margerum v. Sopher, 46 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1932, writ ref'd); Wasson v. Harris, 209 S.W. 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1918,
no writ).
194. Wise & Jackson v. Nott, 283 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1926, no
writ); Griswold v. Tarbell, 242 S.W. 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, writ dism'd).
195. Kelsey v. Lietz, 38 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931, writ dism'd);
Houseman v. Guaranty Sec. Co., 293 S.W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1927, no
writ).
196. Kelsey v. Lietz, 38 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931, writ dism'd).
197. First Nat'l Bank v. Wagner Supply Co., 9 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1928, no writ).
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is retained merely as a party pro forma.198 The possibility of his being
liable is, however, not at an end. Where the principal defendant has omitted
a necessary requirement of the bond, the garnishor's remedy is to have the
bond quashed. If successful, the liabilities existing prior to the filing of the
bond will be revived. 199 Consequently, the garnishee must relinquish the
property with caution because if the bond is subsequently declared invalid
he will not be relieved of his responsibility to make payment to the garnishor.

20 0

TRIAL, JUDGMENT AND ENFORCEMENT

The ultimate issue in the garnishment proceeding is simply whether or not
the garnishee is indebted to or retaining property of the principal defendant.
The questions in controversy in the main suit are not carried over to the
garnishment action.2 0 ' Where the garnishee has filed an answer which has
not been controverted, the court may enter a decree without a trial because
there are no issues to be adjudicated. 20 2 In situations where a traverse has
20 s
been filed, the court will formulate the issues needed for disposal of the suit.
After the issues have been formulated by the court, the garnishor must
sustain the burden of proof. He must provide sufficient evidence that the
198. Thomas v. Buehler, 254 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1953, no writ);
Texas Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 1 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927, no
writ); Griswold v. Tarbell, 242 S.W. 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, writ dism'd).
199.

For example, a bond which is for a sum less than double the amount stated

in the writ is ineffective to relinquish the garnishee's liability. Texas Nat'l Bank v.
First Nat'l Bank, 1 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927, no writ). Moreover,
a replevy bond which fails to meet the statutory requirements will not support a summary judgment. Texas Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 1 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1927, no writ); accord, White v. Suttle, 255 S.W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1923, no writ).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Daniels, 107 S.W.2d 400
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1937, no writ) where the court noted:
If a garnishee surrenders to a judgment debtor impounded funds by virtue of a replevy bond which does not protect the garnishee, he does so at garnishee's risk, for
which the plaintiff can recover directly against the garnishee.
Id. at 402. The sureties to the bond become liable only to the extent that the debtor
is so held. They maintain their rights of subrogation and contribution except when
the debtor is deceased or "notoriously insolvent." Lowe, Collection of Debts by Extraordinary Proceedings: Attachment, Garnishment, Sequestration and Receivership, in
CREDrrORs' RIGHTS IN TExAs 245 (J. McKnight ed. 1963).
201. The garnishment suit usually takes the form of a separate action. Under some
situations, however, the main case may be combined with the garnishment proceeding
to avoid a multiplicity of suits. For example, in Reinertsen v. E.W. Bennett & Sons,
185 S.W. 1027 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1916, writ ref'd) the court permitted a combination of the original suit and the garnishment proceeding where the garnishee and
the defendant treated the garnished property as a trust fund.
202. TEx. R. Civ. P. 666; Gray v. Armour & Co., 129 Tex. 512, 104 S.W.2d 486
(1937); Goodson v. Carr, 428 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Snyder Nat'l Bank v. Pinkston, 219 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1949, no writ).
203. TEx. R. Civ. P. 674, 676.
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garnishee's answer is incorrect, and introduce facts entitling him to judgment. 204 The test of liability on the part of the garnishee is whether the
principal defendant could have successfully obtained a judgment against
him. 205 Once the garnishor establishes 'his allegations by clear and convincing evidence, the burden shifts to the garnishee to prove the statements
made in the answer.
In addition to the situations where a judgment is rendered upon the
garnishee's uncontroverted answer 200 or a judgment is entered following a
trial on the merits, Rule 667 provides for a method of judgment where no
answer has been filed by the garnishee:
If the garnishee fails to file an answer . . . at or before the time

directed in the writ, it shall be lawful for the court, at any time after
judgment shall have been rendered against the defendant, and on or

after appearance day, to render judgment by default . . . against such

garnishee for the full amount of such judgment.. . .
The garnishee may avoid the default judgment by submitting an answer at
any time before the final judgment in the principal case, or appearance day
in the garnishment proceeding. 207 Moreover, failure to give sufficient notice
of the suit to the garnishee will preclude any valid default judgment from
208
being rendered.
Before a judgment can be rendered in any garnishment proceeding, the
garnishor must have procured a valid and subsisting judgment in the principal suit. Furthermore, the verdict must be final. 2 09 If the original suit has
204. The garnishee's answer presents a prima facie defense to any statements made
in it. In order to recover, the garnishor must overcome the answer. Goodson v. Carr,
428 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Jenschke v. Burg, 92 S.W.2d 1095 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1936, no writ).
205. Pearson Grain Co. v. Plains Trucking Co., 494 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Becker v. Cooper, 22 S.W.2d 1083, 1085 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1929, writ dism'd). The garnishor may enforce any rights that the principal defendant could enforce but no greater rights. Pace v. Pierson, 145 S.W.2d 929,
931-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1940, no writ).
206. TEX. R. Civ. P. 666.
207. TEX. R. Civ. P. 667. See also Consolidated Gas. Co. v. Jarecki Mfg. Co., 72
S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934), alf'd, 129 Tex. 644, 105 S.W.2d
663 (1937), where the court held that a garnishee could prevent a default judgment
by entering an answer at any time before judgment was rendered against him.
208. Investor's Diversified Serv., Inc. v. Bruner, 366 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); First Nat'l Bank v. Pacific Cotton Agency, 329 S.W.2d
504 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1959, no writ) (court disallowed a default judgment
rendered within 10 days after writ of garnishment was filed). See also TEx. R. CIv.
P. 107, 124. When the garnishee files an answer that is inadequate, however, this
will not preclude a valid default judgment in favor of the garnishor. Investors Diversified Serv., Inc. v. Bruner, 366 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
209. See, e.g., Clapper v. Petrucci, 497 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973,
no writ); Southern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 496 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ); Weinstein v. Wilhide Equip. Co., 397
S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965, no writ).
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been appealed, it is not final for garnishment purposes. It is only when all
the rights of the parties in the main action have been determined that a valid
final judgment may be proven by the garnishor.
The method of enforcing a valid garnishment judgment is dependent
upon the type of property that forms the basis of the writ. Where the suit
is to satisfy a money judgment, the garnishee must pay the amount of the
judgment or "execution shall issue thereon in the same manner and under the
Same conditions as is or may be provided for . . . in other cases.

' 210

A

judgment upon the effects of the principal defendant retained by the garnishee
21
is enforced by providing for a sale of such effects to satisfy the claim. '
Upon refusal by the garnishee to deliver the property in question to the
sheriff, the court may hold the garnishee in contempt and imprison him until
21 2
delivery of the goods is made.
Channels of appeal are made available to any party to the garnishment
proceeding who is dissatisfied with the outcome. An appeal will be allowed
for cases initiated in a justice court if the amount of the judgment exceeds
$20. The appeal in such cases is heard as a trial de novo in the county
court. Motions made by the parties, such as a motion to quash the writ,
are appealable and the general rules of appellate procedure will apply.
No appeal, however, can be made from a determination to transfer the
3
venue for the suit under Article 4096.21
CONCLUSION

The process of garnishment provides a viable means through which the
courts can prevent a multiplicity of suits by allowing a creditor of the principal defendant to recover what is owed to him through direct litigation with
one who is indebted to the defendant. Additionally, the Texas Legislature and the courts have established strong measures to guarantee that the
defendant-debtor or the garnishee is required to give up only that property or money which constitutes his true indebtedness by providing an action for wrongful garnishment to protect him from false accusations 214 and
210. TEX. R. Civ. P. 668. Daniel v. East Texas Theaters, 127 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
211. TEX. R. Civ. P. 669. "The sale so ordered shall be conducted in all respects
as other sales of personal property under execution; and the officer making such sale

shall execute a transfer of such effects or interest to the purchaser, with a brief recital
of the judgment of the court under which the same was sold." TEX. R. Civ. P. 672.
212. TEX. R. Crv. P. 670; Holloway Seed Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 92 Tex. 187, 191,
47 S.W. 95, 97 (1898).
213. For a further discussion see generally Lowe, Collections of Debts by Extraordinary Proceedings: Attachment, Garnishment, Sequestration and Receivership, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS

249 (J. McKnight ed. 1963).

214. Comment, Creditor's Liability in Texas for Wrongful Attachment, Garnish-

ment, or Execution, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 692, 704-708 (1963).
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by setting out certain statutory exemptions to relieve him from unnecessary
financial burden. It is imperative, however, that the attorney use diligence
to insure that in his pursuit of the remedies offered by the writ of garnishment, he has strictly complied with each statutory requirement. Only in
this way will the combination of safeguards and benefits to be derived from
the writ be maintained.
While the writ of garnishment is instrumental in seizing and preserving
property or funds of the debtor in the possession of third parties, and may
prove to be an effective tool for collecting an unsatisfied judgment, the
judgment creditor may eventually be forced to resort to execution and sale
of the defendant-debtor's property.

Such a situation may result where the

garnishee refuses to pay the amount of the judgment. The situation may
also arise, independent of any garnishment proceeding, as the initial attempt
to collect an unsatisfied judgment.
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EXECUTION

The writ of execution, 215 authorizes the sheriff to levy upon any real and
personal property of the debtor within that officer's county.2 16 In Texas,
with certain exceptions, all real and personal property is subject to execution
based upon a valid judgment rendered in a county, district, or justice
court. 217 A writ of execution, derived from such judgment, authorizes the
sheriff to levy only upon the debtor's non-exempt property located within
2 18
that officer's county.
Article XVI of the Texas Constitution provides that no property may
be executed against if it is specifically exempted by statute. 21 9 The specific
exemptions provided for have been continuously expanded to meet the changing characteristics of property. 220 The purpose of exempting certain prop-

215. See generally TEX. R. Civ. P. 621-656.
216. TEX. R. Civ. P. 637; Miller v. Dunagan, 123 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.
-El Paso 1938, writ dism'd).
217. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5449 (1958); TEX. R. Civ. P. 637. See
also Cox, Judgment Liens, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS 286 (J. McKnight ed. 1963).
218. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 3832-3859 (1966 & Supp. 1974). See
also D. HOLMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT LAW IN TEXAS 324 (State Bar of Texas 1970);
McKinght, Exempt Property, in CREDITORS' Rioirrs IN TEXAS 23 (J. McKnight ed.
1963); G. RAMSEY, COMMERCIAL COLLECTION MANUAL 22 (State Bar of Texas 1972).
219. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 49, 50, 51; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 3832-

3859 (1966 & Supp. 1974).
220. E.g., Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v. Walker, 448 S.W.2d 830, 837 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.), citing Low v. Tandy, 70 Tex. 745, 8 S.W. 620 (1888).
This expanded view can be seen in the court's treatment of various articles such as
a diamond ring as wearing apparel in First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Lake v. Robinson,
124 S.W. 177, 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ) or treating a piano as household
furniture as the court did in Alsup v. Jordan, 69 Tex. 300, 302, 6 S.W. 831, 832
(1887); see Castleberry, Mobile Home Financing, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 269 -70
(1973). Although the exemption statutes do not specifically exempt these items, the

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss4/5

32

Symposium: Creditors' Post-Judgment Remedies in Texas.

1974]

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

erty from execution is to insure that the property necessary to the debtor's
profession, trade, and the preservation of his family is always available for
his use. 221 The courts have consistently held that these exemption statutes
should be liberally construed in favor of the debtor, 222 and that such a construction is necessary in light of the legislature's intentions in enacting the
statutes. 223 Where there is doubt as to the validity of the debtor's claim,
2 24
the property is generally held exempt.
SALE OF HOMESTEAD

The most significant of all the exemptions is the homestead. The Texas
Constitution provides that a 200 acre rural homestead or a $10,000 urban
lot (not including improvements existing at the declaration of the homestead) cannot be subjected to execution, and a forced sale of the homestead
is void. 225 Any excess, however, of the 200 acre rural homestead or the
$10,000 lot in an urban homestead may be levied upon and sold at an exe226
cution sale.
If the homestead is rural, the excess acreage may easily be isolated from
the 200 acres and sold under execution. 227 It is, however, sometimes neces-

sary to sell the entire lot of an urban homestead in order to extract the excess amount of lot value. 2 28

In Whiteman v. Burkey, 229 the court explained

courts have interpreted such items as falling within the exempt categories; Betz v Maier,
33 S.W. 710, 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ). Contra, Meritz v. Palmer, 266 F.2d
265, 268 (5th Cir. 1959). See also Woodward, The Homestead Exemption: A Continuing Need for ConstitutionalRevision, 35 TEXAs L. REV. 1047 (1957).
221. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Burgess, 155 S.W.2d 977, 980 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1941, writ ref'd); Malone v. Kennedy, 272 S.W. 509, 510 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1925, no writ), quoting Cone v. Lewis, 64 Tex. 331 (1885).
222. Carson v. McFarland, 206 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947,
writ ref'd); accord, Betz v. Maier, 33 S.W. 710, 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ).
See also Comment, Estoppel of Husband and Wife to Claim Constitutional Protection
of their Homestead, 25 TExAs L. REV. 76, 81 (1947).
223. Carson v. McFarland, 206 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947,
writ ref'd).
224. Id. at 132.
225. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51; TEx. REV. CIv. STAT ANN. art. 3833 (Supp. 1974);
Atkins v. Schmid, 129 S.W. 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, no writ); see Ward
v. Braun, 417 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1967, no writ) where the
court stated: "[Tihe homestead may be so encumbered with liens that its permanency
as a home may be defeated at the will of the lienholder, in which case the widow
may have an allowance in lieu of the exemption." Id. at 892.
226. Clement v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex. 342, 350, 282 S.W. 558, 561 (1926);
see TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3844 (1966).
See McSwain, The Texas Business
Homestead, 15 BAYLOR L. REV. 39, 53-54 (1963) for a discussion of the non-exempt,
excess portion of the business urban homestead.
227. Beall v. Hollingsworth, 46 S.W. 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, no writ); accord
White v. Glenn, 138 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, writ dism'd
jdgmt cor.).
228. Harrison v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 S.W. 269, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1920), aff'd, 238 S.W. 209 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted).
229. 286 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1926, no writ). It should be noted
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the technique used in segregating an urban excess. The values of the lot
and the improvements must first be determined; and if there is an excess value in the lot, over the statutory exemption, it will be awarded to the

creditor. 23 0

When it becomes necessary to sell the homestead to effect a

partition of the excess, "the proceeds of such sale should be apportioned
to the improvements and the lot in accordance with the respective values
found by the trial court .... ,,231 If no such excess exists, the defendant

is allowed to maintain his homestead right without interruption by sale.
When the homestead has been abandoned, it ceases to be exempt from
execution. 2 112 Likewise, whenever the homestead is encumbered by a purchase money mortgage, a mechanic or builder's lien, or a tax lien, the

exempt status of the property is relinquished. 233 The judgment debtor is
often faced with the threat of having his partly exempt homestead sold
through an execution sale. This constant intimidation will usually result
in a delinquent judgment being satisfied before the creditor resorts to the
234
sale of the debtor's homestead.
TRUSTS

A popular method used to exempt property from creditors is the testamen-

tary trust.23 5 The transfer of property into a trust, however, does not automatically exempt the devisee's property. Once the beneficiary acquires a

present vested interest, that interest may be levied upon and alienated from
the beneficiary-judgment debtor. 236

The estate must be of a determinable

and certain character so as not to defeat the purpose of the trust,23 7 and so
as not to subject the execution purchaser to a sale of uncertain title to prop238

erty.

that Whiteman deals specifically with the problem of a forced sale by the children
of a deceased wife against the surviving husband and father, but the same law may
be applied to a debtor-creditor relationship. id. at 351.
230. Id. at 351.
231. Id. at 351.
232. Harrison v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 S.W. 269, 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1920), aft'd, 238 S.W. 209, 212 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted).
233. Oakwood State Bank v. Durham, 21 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1929, no writ). A judgment lien attaches to property on the date it ceased to be homestead and becomes subject to sale. See TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.

234. G.

RAMSEY,

COMMERCIAL

COLLECTIONS MANUAL

22 (State Bar of Texas,

1972).
235. See Time Sec. v. West, 324 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
236. Little v. Deaton, 416 S.W.2d 828, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1967, no
writ); see Estes v. Estes, 267 S.W. 709, 711 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted).
237. Gamble v. Dabney, 20 Tex. 69, 77 (1857); accord, Chase v. York County Say.
Bank, 89 Tex. 316, 36 S.W. 406 (1896).
238. Eubank v. Moore, 297 S.W. 791, 794-95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1927, rev'd
on other grounds, 15 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss4/5

34

Symposium: Creditors' Post-Judgment Remedies in Texas.

1974]

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

It is well settled, however, that a creditor of a beneficiary may not execute
upon any part of a spendthrift trust 239 in the hands of a trustee.2 40 In Hoffman v. Rose, 24 1 a case involving a spendthrift trust, the court discussed a
seizure of -the corpus of the estate in the hands of a trustee, and a sale of
the interest of the beneficiary without disturbing the trustee during the life of
the trust. 242 The court reasoned that the purpose of the testator would be
defeated by the sale of any part of the corpus of a spendthrift trust. 243
While the legal title is vested in the trustee for the life of the trust, the interest of the beneficiary may not be subjected to execution because it would
244
disrupt the interest of the settlor.
In Texas, however, spendthrift trusts may be executed upon when the claim
is for child support. 245 The majority of other jurisdictions recognize execution on spendthrift trusts when claims are for necessities furnished the beneficiary, services or materials furnished which preserve the interest of the
beneficiary, and government claims as well as support claims. 246
PROPERTY AND INTEREST OF A DECEASED, HEIR, AND DEVISEE

When a judgment debtor dies and judgment is pending, unsatisfied execution may not issue against the decedent's estate without the proper procedure. 247 To obtain any cash that the decedent may have had in order to
satisfy the judgment, the creditor must go through the probate court rather
than directly levying upon the property of the deceased. 248 The real and
personal property of the deceased other than cash is obtained by filing an
affidavit in the court where the appointment of the estate's representa2 49
tive is made.
239. As to the general characteristics of a spendthrift trust, the court stated in Lind-

sey v. Rose, 175 S.W. 829, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1915, writ ref'd) that under
this doctrine . . . it is lawful for a testator or grantor to create a trust estate for
the life of the cestui que trust, with the provision that the latter shall receive and
enjoy the avails at times and in amounts either fixed by the instrument or left to
the discretion of the trustee, and that such avails shall not be subject to alienation
by the beneficiary nor liable for his debts.
240. Hines v. Sands, 312 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, no
writ), citing Hoffman v. Rose, 217 S.W. 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1919, writ
ref'd).
241. 217 S.W. 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1919, writ ref'd).
242. Id. at 427.
243. Id. at 427. See also Gamble v. Dabney, 20 Tex. 69 (1857).
244. Hoffman v. Rose, 217 S.W. 424, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1919, writ ref'd).
245. Lucas v. Lucas, 365 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, no
writ).
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959).
247. Mackey v. Lucey Prods. Corp., 150 Tex. 188, 190, 239 S.W.2d 607, 608 (1951).
See also TEx. R. Civ. P. 625 (money of deceased); TEX. R. CIv. P. 626 (property of
deceased).
248. TEx. R. Civ. P. 625.
249. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 626. The court in Mackey v. Lucey Prods. Corp., 150 Tex.
188, 190, 239 S.W.2d 607, 608 (1951) noted that the property transmitted through
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While the estate of a deceased debtor may be executed upon through the
procedure indicated above, the interest of the heir, devisee, or legatee in the
estate may also be subjected to execution by their creditors.2 50 A creditor
of the devisee may execute on the personal and real property of the devisee,
but his claim is subordinated to the debts of the decedent's estate. 25 1 Although the interest may be defeated by another creditor of the administration, "this possibility does not change the character of the interest so as to
'252
render it exempt from execution.
PROPERTY INCUSTODIA LEGIS
Another type of property that has been declared to be free from creditors
is property held in the custody of the law. 253 Property in custodia legis denotes status of property when the court has appointed a custodian of the
funds or property. The court has effectively taken the property from the
control of the litigants. 254 The policy behind exempting such property from
execution is to prevent any confusion or interference with a court's jurisdiction over subject matter. 255 Such confusion or interference may occur
when a writ of execution is issued by one court against the same property over which another court has appointed a custodian. If this situation
arises, the court which ordered the receivership may enjoin the writ of execution to avoid undue delay and confusion. 256
The exempt status of property in custodia legis from execution by credithe proper court whether it be money or property, and any sale or execution not
issued under the court will be voided.
250. Littlefield v. Ungren, 206 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1947,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
251. Id. at 156; accord, Meek v. Republic Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 9 F. Supp. 651,
657 (S.D. Tex. 1935). This decision was modified in Wallace v. Republic Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 80 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 683 (1936); Lemmel
v. Pauska, 54 Tex. 505, 509 (1881); McGriff v. Hazle, 201 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1947, no writ). See also Tax. PROBATE CODE ANN. § 37 (Supp.
1974).
252. Lozano v. Guerra, 140 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940,
no writ). The court stated in Lozano that the purchaser at an execution sale is
charged with notice of any indebtedness of the debtor's estate, and the purchaser takes
only what interest the debtor possessed. Id. at 589; accord, Bell v. Read, 56 S.W.
584, 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ).
253. Challenge Co. v. Sartin, 260 S.W. 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1924, no writ);
Pruett v. Fortenberry, 254 S.W. 592, 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1923, no writ).
254. Texas Trunk Ry. v. Lewis, 81 Tex. 1 (1891). In the Lewis case it was stated
that "the title of the receiver is of the date at which it is ordered that a receiver be
appointed." Id. at 8.
255. Fielder v. Parker, 119 S.W.2d 1089, 1094 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1938, no
writ) (where property executed on was under receivership appointed by a different
court than the one that issued the writ); accord, Glenn v. Connell, 74 S.W.2d 451, 454
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934, no writ).
256. Challenge Co. v. Sartin, 260 S.W. 313, 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1925, no
writ).
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tors ends when the reason for controlling such property no longer exists. 2, 7
The end of control by the court most frequently occurs when a decree is entered for distribution or when the representative of the funds or property in
custody ceases to have any duties except making payments or returning property to entitled persons. 258 The excess funds remaining after the sale of
property or money in the hands of a receiver cannot be executed upon, 259
but it has been held that the surplus funds in the possession of a sheriff
260
can be garnished where the execution creditors have been satisfied.
The sheriff has no remaining duties to perform after the61 creditors have been
2
paid and he holds the funds only in a private capacity.
EQUITABLE INTERESTS IN REALTY AND LEASEHOLDS

At common law, equitable interests were not subject to execution for the
26 2
simple reason that a writ of execution was issued only from courts of law.
Now equitable ownership in two types of real property interests-freeholds
and leaseholds-may be subject to execution depending on the circum263
stances surrounding their equitable ownership.
In Jensen v. Wilkinson 2 64 the court pointed out that a mere equity in
property, as distinguished from an equitable title to property, is not subject
to execution. 26 5 A person who expects to inherit realty is an example of
one who has a mere equity while a person who has a vested remainder in
property has an equitable title to property subject to execution. 266 The common example of an equitable title to property is the sale of land under the
doctrine of part performance. 267 Once the vendee has met the requirements
257. Id. at 314.
258. Id. at 314.
259. Id. at 313.

260. Goodson v. Carr, 428 S.W.2d 875, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
261. Id. at 879.
262. Glenney v. Crane, 352 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
263. See Moser & Son v. Tucker & Co., 87 Tex. 94, 96, 26 S.W. 1044, 1045 (1894).
264.

133 S.W.2d 982 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).

265. ld. at 986.
266. See Caples v. Ward, 107 Tex. 341, 343, 179 S.W. 856, 857 (1915) (vested remainder); Hendricks v. Snediker, 30 Tex. 292, 307-08 (1867) (mere equity in realty);
Ferguson v. Chapman, 94 S.W.2d 593, 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1936, writ
dism'd); cf. Smith v. Whitfield, 67 Tex. 124, 2 S.W. 822 (1886). Where an interest
in personal property is contingent, such cannot be levied upon. A vested interest, such
as life estates in personalty, however, are subject to execution sales. Allen v. Russell,
19 Tex. 87 (1857).
267. In Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Eustics, 28 S.W. 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no
writ) the court stated: "[A] subsequent parol agreement, accompanied with possession and payment of the purchase money, without evidence of the making of valuable

improvements, would not be sufficient to confer such title . .. as would be subject
to levy and sale.

. .

."

Id. at 229.
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under the doctrine, his interest in the real estate is subject to execution. 268
An equity in property is deemed non-executable to avoid confusion at an
execution sale. Such a sale would not permit the purchaser to know what
property he was bidding on, and the sheriff would not be able to designate
any particular property that would be subject to the writ. 269 The uncertainty of the sale also often results in the creditor's failure to realize com-

270
plete satisfaction of his judgment.
A lease interest that is assignable may also be subject to execution. 271
In Moser & Son v. Tucker & Co., 272 the court concluded that a fee simple estate was subject to sale against the debtor only if the debtor had authority
to pass title to the property by his own act. 2 78 It logically follows that if a
lessee has authority to assign his interest, then it is also subject to execution. It must be remembered, however, that under Texas law, this authority
to assign can be achieved only through the landlord's consent unless there is
274
a provision to the contrary in the lease agreement.

UNDIVIDED INTERESTS

Undivided property interests in Texas may be levied upon and sold at
an execution sale without subjecting the interests of the joint owners to partition. 275 When execution is to be had on a joint interest in land, notice
of the sale is required to be given to the judgment debtor or the judgment
268. Id. at 229. See Curlin v. Hendricks, 35 Tex. 225 (1871); Matula v. Lane,
56 S.W. 112, 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ).
269. Daugherty v. Cox's Adm'r., 13 Tex. 209, 213 (1854).
270. Jensen v. Wilkinson, 133 S.W.2d 982, 986 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939,
writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); accord, Chase v. York County Sav. Bank, 89 Tex. 316, 322,
36 S.W. 406, 409 (1896), quoting Hendrick v. Snediker, 30 Tex. 307 (1867); Moser
& Son v. Tucker & Co., 87 Tex. 94, 96, 26 S.W. 1044, 1045 (1894); Daugherty v.
Cox's Adm'r, 13 Tex. 209, 213 (1854); see O'Neal v. Clymer, 61 S.W. 545, 547 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1900, writ dism'd).
271. Jensen v. Wilkinson, 133 S.W.2d 982, 986 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939,
writ dism'd jdgmt cor.), citing Moser & Son v. Tucker & Co., 87 Tex. 94, 26 S.W.
1044 (1894). The court in Jenven also mentions that a possibility of reverter, if not
subject to a voluntary sale, would not be subject to a forced sale on execution. Id.
at 985.
272. 87 Tex. 94, 26 S.W. 1044 (1894).
273. Id. at 96, 26 S.W. at 1045; accord, Shaw v. Frank, 334 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, no writ). In Moser, it was "conceded that no property
or interest in property is subject to sale under execution or like process, unless the
debtor, if sui juris, has power to pass title to such property or interest in property
by his own act." Moser & Son v. Tucker & Co., 87 Tex. 94, 96, 26 S.W. 1044, 1045
(1894); accord, Glenny v. Crane, 352 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
274. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5237 (1962) prevents assignments without the
permission of the landlord. Execution sale would have the effect of creating an assignment without the consent of the landlord, constituting a void sale.
275. Brown v. Renfro, 63 Tex. 600, 603 (1885).
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debtor's attorney, 276 and the land may be subjected to sale 277 even if the
278
property is pending partition in another action.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

When the real and personal property involved is used primarily for agricultural purposes, a judgment creditor is usually restricted to an execution
upon the crops growing on the land. This restriction is based on two factors. First, the statutory exemptions of the farmer prevent his rural homestead from being subjected to execution and his equipment, classified as
tools of his trade, is also exempt. 279 Second, the tight cash situation often af-

fecting the farmer prevents execution upon his money. The farmer usually
borrows from a local credit association and immediately places these funds
into his farming operations. The creditor then is left with only one alternative; the levy and sale of the debtor's growing crops. The crops ready to be
harvested and produced by annual cultivation are not considered part of the

realty, but are considered to be chattels, capable of voluntary transfer, and
may therefore be levied upon and sold at an execution sale. 280
SURETY-PRINCIPAL PROPERTY

When the judgment debtor serves as principal in a principal-surety
relationship, the judgment debtor's property must be subjected to execution

first. 28 ' The surety's interest is also available to make up the balance of the
276. TEX. R. Cv. P. 647.
277. Braden v. Gose, 57 Tex. 37, 42 (1882); Sharp v. Yniguez, 324 S.W.2d 291,
294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, no writ).
278. Brown v. Renfro, 63 Tex. 600, 603 (1885).
The most common undivided
interest in Texas, community property, may also be subject to sale, while the separate
property of either spouse remains exempt from execution creditors of the other spouse.
Braden v. Gose, 57 Tex. 37, 41 (1882); Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d
426, 430 (Tex. Sup. 1970). See also McKnight, Liability of Separate and Community
Property for Obligations of Spouses to Strangers, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS 330
(J. McKnight ed. 1963). Partition has also been held unnecessary to execute upon
an undivided remainder interest owned by the judgment debtor. Turner v. Miller, 255
S.W. 237, 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1923, no writ). In Turner, the court held
that the only requirement is that the remainder be vested at the time of levy and sale.
279. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 3832, 3833 (1966 & Supp. 1974). See also
McKnight, Exempt Property, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS 56 (J. McKnight ed. 1963).
280. Willis v. Moore, 59 Tex. 628, 637 (1883).
The Texas Supreme Court determined a method to show whose interests are being executed upon when crops are taken
in satisfaction of a debt by execution during land sale transaction. If there has been
a severance of the growing crops from the land sold, then the sale does not pass title
to the crops. Thus, execution on crops may still be valid even when the debtor does
not own the land from which the crops were taken. Id. at 639; accord, Gulf Stream
Realty Co. v. Monte Alto Citrus Ass'n, 253 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd); Ellis v. Bingham, 150 S.W. 602, 603 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1912, no writ).
281. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3786 (1966).
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amount shown in the writ of execution. 28 2 But if the surety's property is
levied upon because of a lack of the principal's property, the judgment
debtor is still not relieved of his obligation under the judgment.28 3 The
surety obtains all the rights of the execution creditor against the debtor. The
surety is entitled to levy on the principal's property for the amount of all
costs and payments. 28 4 In some instances there may be two or more sureties
serving the same principal. If there is a co-surety, then the surety who is
executed upon is also authorized to execute on both the co-suretys' for his
proportionate share of the judgment, 2 8 and the principal's property.
CORPORATE STOCK AND PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY

286
UnAt common law, corporate shares were not subject to execution.
der Article 8 of the Investment Securities Act, however, a stock certificate
may be levied upon if the security instrument is actually seized by the officer

authorized to make the attachment or levy. 28 7

The purpose of requiring

that the stock certificate be actually seized is to eliminate any possible transfer
of the security after execution.

28

The corporate assets may not be subjected to execution by a creditor of a
shareholder because the creditor cannot reach assets to which the debtor
himself is not entitled. 289 Once the shareholder attains a right to receive
290
or liquidation, 291
corporate property or income in the form of dividends
his property may be levied upon and sold. 29 2 However, when the "corporation is being used as a vehicle by which the owner conducts a fraudulent
282. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3786 (1966);

TEX. Bus. & COMM.

CODE

§ 34.03(a) (1968); Kelso v. Pratt, 26 Tex. 381 (1862).
283. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 34.04(a) (1968).
284. TEX.Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 34.04(b)(1) (1968).
285. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 34.04(b) (2) (1968).
286. Keating v.J. Stone & Sons Live Stock Co., 83 Tex. 467, 471, 18 S.W. 797,
798 (1892); Menard v. Shaw, 5 Tex. 334, 337 (1849). The Supreme Court, in Combs
v. Hodge, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 397, 407 (1858), cited Menard to distinguish the transfer
of stock from the delivery of ordinary chattels. See Rain, Technical Observations Concerning the Pledge of CorporationShares, 30 TEXAS L. REV.684, 712 (1952).
287. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 8.317(a) (1968); TEX. R. CIrv. P. 641. In
Frost v. Davis, 288 F.2d 497, 498-99 (5th Cir. 1961), the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that stock of a foreign corporation may also be levied upon and
sold if the actual certificate is seized. Injunctions are also provided by statute to obtain control of the security, but the security itself must be taken to achieve a valid
levy upon the stock. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 8.317(b) (1968).
288. See Combs v. Hodge, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 397, 407 (1858).
ANN.

289. McKnight, Exempt Property, in

CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS

57 (J. McKnight

ed. 1963), citing TEX.Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.38(a) (1956).
290. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.38 (1956).
291. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 2.40 (1956), 6.06 (Supp. 1974), 7.11 (1956).
These provisions provide for partial liquidation (2.40), articles of dissolution (6.06),
and depositing amounts due shareholders and creditors with the state treasurer (7.11).
292. McKnight, Exempt Property, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS 57 (J. McKnight
ed. 1963).
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scheme or promotional venture, the corporate fiction of said corporation may
be disregarded, in order to circumvent fraud .... -293
Partnership property is not subject to execution for the benefit of the creditors of individual partners. It is, however, subject to the creditors of the
partnership. 294 Of course, by definition, partnership creditors may execute on
the partners' individual interest when the assets of the business have been
exhausted. 29 5 Likewise an individual partner's creditor may levy on that
296
specific partner's interest.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS

According to the fraudulent transfer statutes, 297 "when an insolvent
debtor, in payment of a pre-existing debt, delivers property in value in excess of the debt, thereby placing the surplus beyond the reach of creditors,
the conveyance is fraudulent in law and void as to excess." 298 In addition
to any transfer of real or personal property, the execution process itself has
also been deemed void with respect to a creditor or purchaser who intends
to delay or defraud another creditor. 299 This problem of the execution process inadvertently resulting in a fraudulent conveyance was addressed in
Security Loan Association v. Ward.300 The court stated that if a debtor has
no other property subject to execution after he transfers his property to a
creditor, then such transfer will be considered invalid as to an unsatisfied
creditor of the transferor .36 Therefore, before a creditor levies on the defendant's property, he should examine the possibility that the debtor may be
or become insolvent upon execution, thereby rendering the complete process void.
The test used in Ward to determine whether the execution was fraudulent as to other creditors, however, may not always be relied upon. Article
24.02 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, which invalidates conveyances made to defraud creditors, has no effect on a conveyance of exempt property. 30 2 Additionally, when an insolvent debtor disposes of his
293. Irish v. Bahner, 109 S.W.2d 1023, 1025 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937, writ
dism'd).
294. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 25(2)(c) (1970).

295. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 6132 b,§ 18(1)(a) (1970).
296. TEX. R.Civ. P.642.
297. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. 8H 24.01-24.05 (1968).

298. Lee v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co., 222 S.W. 283, 284 (Tex.Civ. App.
-Dallas 1920, no writ).
299. TEx. Bus & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.02(a) (1968).

300. 444 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex.Civ. App.-El Paso 1968, no writ).
301. Id. at 368.

302. Wells v. Jamison, 252 S.W. 1023, 1024 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, jdgmt
adopted); accord, Chandler v. Welborn, 156 Tex. 312, 316, 294 S.W.2d 801, 805
(1956); Amarillo Nat'l Bank v. Liston, 464 S.W.2d 395, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Crow v. First Nat'l Bank, 64 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1933, writ ref'd).
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assets in exchange for an exempt homestead, the courts have held this exchange not to be a fraud upon his creditors. 03
MORTGAGED PROPERTY

Property which the judgment debtor has sold, mortgaged, or conveyed in
trust is not liable to execution if the purchaser, mortgagee, or trustee identifies other property of the debtor sufficient in that county to satisfy the
judgment.30 4 If the debtor has no other property to satisfy the debt, and
in the case of real property, the mortgagor has legal title, and the debtor's
remaining interest is subject to execution. 8° - Likewise, the mortgagor's
equity of redemption in realty may be subjected to levy and sale. 306 Although the title to mortgaged property remains in the mortgagor, the title
may be divested by foreclosure proceedings, at which time the mortgagor's
interest in the land ceases,3 0 7 the execution purchaser taking the mortgagor's
interest subject to the lien created by the mortgage. 30 8
The mortgagor's interest in personal property as well as the equity of redemption in mortgaged personalty may also be sold under execution. 09 The
purchaser at an execution sale receives such an interest subject to any encumbrances existing thereon,8 10 and he must comply with the conditions involved before he can take possession of the goods from any third party who
holds them. 11 If a lienholder's rights are jeopardized by the execution sale,
he may remedy the situation by acquiring a writ of injunction or sequestration. Although protection is given the lienholder, these writs do not affect
the rights of the mortgagor's interest to be sold under execution. 312 The
mortgaged property, under certain circumstances, may not be subject to exe303. Bell v. Bealey, 45 S.W. 401, 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, no writ); accord, Morris
v. Morris, 482 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ).
304. TEX. REV. CTV. STAT. ANN. art. 3792 (1966); see In re Pierce Oil Co. v. Carroll,
277 S.W. 220, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1925, no writ).
305. Ballard v. Anderson, 18 Tex. 377, 386 (1857).

306. Smothers v. Field, Thayer & Co., 65 Tex. 435, 439 (1886); Fant Milling Co.

v. May, 240 S.W.2d 445, 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (dissent-

ing opinion); see Simmons Hardware Co. v. Kaufman & Runge, 77 Tex. 131, 137, 8
S.W. 283, 287 (1888).

307. Wilkins v. Bryarly, 46 S.W. 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, no writ).
308. Wootton v. Wheeler, 22 Tex. 338, 340 (1858).
309. Garrity & Huey v. Thompson & Ohmstede, 64 Tex. 597, 599 (1885) (mortgagor's interest in personal property); Sparks v. Pace, 60 Tex. 298, 299 (1883); Raysor
v. Reid & Smith, 55 Tex. 266, 270 (1881) (equity of redemption in mortgaged personalty); Wootton v. Wheeler, 22 Tex. 338, 339 (1858); Gillian v. Henderson, 12 Tex.
47, 48 (1854); Wright v. Henderson, 12 Tex. 43, 44 (1854); Beil v. Lebo, 74 S.W.2d

187 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, no writ); Wilkerson v. Stasny & Holub, 183
S.W. 1191, 1192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1916, no writ).
310. Beil v. Lebo, 74 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, no writ).
311. TEX. R. CIV. P. 643. This rule also applies to property in the possession of
a pledgee, assignee, or mortgagee.
312. Raysor v. Reid & Smith, 55 Tex. 266, 271 (1881).
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cution due to its being recognized as part of the debtor's homestead. In
that the creditor-mortgagor
such cases, however, it should be remembered
3 13
still has available the remedy of foreclosure.
While a mortgagor's interest may be executed upon, the vendor's interest

in a vendor's lien is not subject to the execution process by the vendor's
creditors.3 14 The vendor has relinquished his legal title, and his equitable
interest in rescission may not be levied upon and sold. The interest of the
vendor is deemed non-executable even where the real estate contract calls

for monthly payments with an execution of warranty deed upon completion of payments 315 or where there is an assignment of a vendor's interest

to a third party.3 16 The vendor's interest, however, can be levied upon and
317
sold after rescission, if a rescission occurs.
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND EXECUTION

The Uniform Commercial Code does not specify the requirements for execution on personalty. 318 There are, however, general provisions which, by
implication, sanction the use of execution when such process is desired.3 19
Differences in state law frequently arise, especially in determination of
when an execution lien attaches320to personalty, and each state's execution
statutes will govern the outcome.

The Texas version of Article 9 of the UCC provides that the secured party
after default, "may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure." '321 Although
the most common method of recovery is repossession after default,3 22 cer313. Low v. Tandy, 70 Tex. 745, 748, 8 S.W. 620, 621 (1888). Here, the mortgagee unsuccessfully executed upon machinery which attached as a fixture to the realty
(homestead), instead of foreclosing upon his mortgage.
314. Todd & Hurley v. Garner, 133 S.W. 314, 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ
ref'd).
315. Hodgkinson v. United States, 5 F.2d 628, 629 (5th Cir. 1925).
316. Brotherton v. Anderson, 66 S.W. 682, 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, writ ref'd).
317. Rutherford v. Mothershed, 92 S.W. 1021, 1023 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, writ
ref'd).
318. See Rudd, A Postscript Concerning The Uniform Commercial Code, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS (J. McKnight ed. 1963); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-4, at 964 (1972).
319. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.311, 9.501 (1968). Under section 9.311,
the debtor's rights in collateral may be sold through judicial process even though there
may be a provision prohibiting or making the transfer a default. See In re Adrian
Research & Chem. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 269 F.2d 734 (3d Cir. 1959) where landlord
caused judgment to be entered on tenant, creating a security interest in equipment. The
landlord issued execution and levied on all of tenant's personal property.
320. See Note, Creditors' Rights-Enf!rcing a Judgment-When is a Lien Created
on Property of Judgment Debtor? 45 Ky. L.J. 304 (1956).
321. TEX.Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.501(a) (1968); see In re Adrian Research
& Chem. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 269 F.2d 734 (3d Cir. 1959).
322. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.503 (1968); see Godwin v. Stanley, 331
S.W.2d 341, 342-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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tain disadvantages may arise from the use of this method.3 23 First, the
secured party may repossess his property without judicial process only when
he can do so without a breach of the peace.3 24 If peaceful repossession
cannot be achieved, then levy and sale must be resorted to. Second, repossession only affects the collateral and if its sale does not satisfy the
existing debt that it secures, the creditor must proceed to sue for a deficiency.a25 Execution, on the other hand, provides a more complete
remedy in that if the collateral upon resale will prove insufficient to satisfy
the debt, the creditor may turn to other property of the debtor. 32 6 Despite
these disadvantages and the fact that the execution process is favorable to
the creditor in that it is treated as a foreclosure of the security interest and
relates back to the date of the perfection of the security interest in the collateral, 327 repossession still remains the most significant procedure in se3 28
cured transactions.
The Uniform Commerical Code states that the debtor's interest in a secured transaction may be subject to execution,3 29 but it does not consider
the question of whether the interest of a secured party may also be executable. 330 Under article 9, "a security interest is strictly ancillary to the under33 2
lying obligation" 331 which would prevent the use of the writ of execution.
323. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-4, at 964
(1972). In Godwin v. Stanley, 331 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), the court stated that "It is definitely determined in this state that a mortgagee cannot use force or violence to recover the property mortgaged but has a right
to peaceably take the property or resort to his legal rights in taking the same." Id.
at 342-43.
324. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.§ 9.503 (1968); see Singer Sewing Mach. Co.
v. Rios, 96 Tex. 174, 71 S.W. 275 (1903). For a discussion of the constitutionality
of section 9.503 under the due process clause of the 14th amendment, see Hughes,
Are Creditor's Self-Help Remedies Violative of Due Process in Texas?, 5 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 701 (1973).
325. J. WmrE & R. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-4, at 964
(1972).
326. Id. at 964. See also TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.501(d) (1968) which
provides:
If the security agreement covers both real and personal property, the secured
party may proceed under this subchapter as to the personal property or he may
proceed as to both the real and the personal property in accordance with his rights
and remedies in respect of the real property in which case the provisions of this
subchapter do not apply.
327. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.501(e) (1968).
328. Repossession gives an adequate, quick means of relief while the procedure under the writ of execution is rarely used because of "court delay, search for non-exempt
assets and sheriff's sale .... ." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 26-4, at 964 (1972).
329. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.311 (1968); see In re Adraian Research
& Chem. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 269 F.2d 734 (3d Cir. 1959).
330. See Dugan, Creditors' Post-Judgment Remedies: Part 1, 25 ALA. L.J. 175, 20010 (1972).
331. Id. at 208.
332. Id. at 208.
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Because of new definitions being given to security arrangements under the
Code, the traditional view of executions on notes may have been abandoned.33 3 For example, under the definitions of "chattel paper," the writing
is evidenced by both a monetary obligation and a security interest.3 3 4 The
chattel paper is owed only to the holder in this situation. Therefore, there
is an indication that an execution on the instrument itself will also be an execution on the underlying obligation of the note . 3 5 This alleviates any traditional notion that payment on a note will not necessarily act as payment
on the underlying obligation. 336 It is settled, however, that negotiable instruments under the Uniform Commercial Code3 37 are not subject to execution until they leave the hands of the maker and are delivered to the
payee.A3
While in the hands of the maker, the instrument is deemed to
39
have no vitality, and execution on such is worthless.3
Like the proceedings in garnishment, successful use of the writ of execution is dependent upon a strict and thorough adherence to the rules of procedure established by the Texas Legislature and the judiciary.
PROCEDURE IN EXECUTION
The Supreme Court established the primary authority for the issuance of
a writ of execution by dictating that judgments shall be enforced by execution or other appropriate process. 340 A valid, final judgment which arises
when the judgment debtor has waived or forfeited his right to move for a
34 1
new trial or appeal is a necessary requisite for obtaining the writ.
All writs of execution have a specified, finite lifespan, returnable to the
issuing court within 30, 60, or 90 days as requested by the judgment creditor.3 42 Once the return date has expired, the writ is without force or effect 343 and the sheriff's right to take and sell property thereafter is termi333.

TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.802 (1968).

Here, the underlying security

instrument and the money obligation are said to be one and the same. Contra, Taylor
v. Gillean, 23 Tex. 508 (1859).
334. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(a)(2) (1968).
335. Dugan, Creditors' Post-Judgment Remedies: Part 1, 25 ALA. L.J. 175, 208-09
(1972); see Tux. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.802(a)(2) (1968).
336. Dugan, Creditors' Post-Judgment Remedies: Part 1, 25 ALA. L.J. 175 (1972).
See Taylor v. Gillean, 23 Tex. 508, 516 (1859) for the traditional view on notes and
accounts.
337. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(a) (1968).
338. Sheldon v. Stagg, 169 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943, writ
ref'd w.o.m.).

339. Id. at 553.
340. TEx. R. Civ. P. 621.
341, Danielson v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 55 F. 49 (8th CIr. 1893); McMillan
v. McMillan, 67 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933, no writ).
342. TEx. R. Civ. P. 621.
343. Mitchell v. Ireland, 54 Tex. 301, 306 (1881); Hester v. Duprey, 46 Tex. 625,
627 (1877); Towns v. Harris, 13 Tex. 254, 257 (1855); Chance v. Pace, 151 S.W. 843,
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34 4

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 629 establishes the necessary official form
for a writ of execution.a 45 One of the key elements of form is the proper
identification of the judgment debtor, therefore, a failure to properly identify
the debtor will render the execution void.3 46 Once this requirement has
been met, a writ will never be void unless the issuing court lacked power
or jurisdiction to issue the writ. 47 Other defects and irregularities in the
statutory form, however, such as the inclusion of excessive charges for cost
of rendering the execution will only make the execution voidable.348 If the
debtor desires to contest a writ due to irregularities, this must be done
within a reasonable time or the debtor's right to contest the writ will be
49

deemed waived.3

To insure that a writ of execution is, in fact, based upon a final judgment,
the court is prohibited from issuing the writ until 20 days have elapsed following the rendition of the judgment, provided that a supersedeas bond has
not been filed and approved. 3 10 Strict adherence to this 20-day waiting
period, however, is not mandatory. Any orders prematurely issued are considered merely voidable rather than void,3 5 ' and in special circumstances,
the creditor is allowed to seek issuance of the writ before the waiting period
845 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1912, no writ); Reagan v. Evans, 21 S.W. 427, 429
(Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).
344. Hester v. Duprey, 46 Tex. 625, 627 (1877); Young v. Smith, 23 Tex. 584,
587 (1859); Long v. Castaneda, 475 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Chance v. Pace, 151 S.W. 843, 845 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1912, no writ).
345. TEx. R. Civ. P. 629. This Rule provides that the execution shall be: styled
"State of Texas," addressed to any sheriff or constable, signed by the clerk or justice
officially and bear the seal of the court. The execution shall require the officer
to execute according to its terms. Additionally, it must describe the judgment stating
the court, time, parties involved and include a bill of cost.
346. Long v. Castaneda, 475 S.W.2d 578, 583-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But cf. Cooke v. Avery, 147 U.S. 375 (1893). The Court
in Cooke held that the filing of an abstract based on an execution which was entered
in the name of a company owned by the judgment debtor and did not name the individual debtor was not fatally deficient. Id. at 391.
347. Houston Oil Co. v. Randolph, 251 S.W. 794, 797 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923,
jdgmt adopted).
348. Brown v. Bonougli, 111 Tex. 275, 278, 232 S.W. 490, 493 (1921); Houston
Oil Co. v. Randolph, 251 S.W. 794, 797 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, jdgmt adopted).
349. Morris v. Hastings, 70 Tex. 26, 28, 7 S.W. 649, 650 (1888); Sydnor v. Roberts,
13 Tex. 299, 308 (1855).
350. Tax. R. Civ. P. 627.
351. Boggess v. Howard, 40 Tex. 154, 159 (1874); Sydnor v. Roberts, 13 Tex. 299,
308 (1855); Bradford v. Ferrell, 381 S.W.2d 204, 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1964, no writ); South Falls Corp. v. Davenport, 368 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1963, no writ); Interstate Life Ins. Co. v. Arrington, 307 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, no writ). But see Graham v. Thomas D. Murphy Co.,
497 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ filed). The court in Graham
stated that the 20-day rule under Rule 627 is superseded by the 10-day provision of
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expires. Rule 628 allows issuance if the creditor believes that the defendant
intends to secret or remove property subject to execution out of the county
before the writ can issue. Improper application of this rule may not render
the resulting sale void but merely voidable., 2 In seeking to have the writ
of execution issued, the creditor, if difficulty arises, may also seek by writ of
mandamus to have the clerk of the court compelled to perform the ministerial
35 3
act of issuing the writ.
The clerk of each court is required to maintain an execution docket which
must specifically state the names of the parties, amount of judgment,
amount due on the judgment, rate of interest above 6 percent, cost, date of
issuance, to whom the writ was delivered and the date of its return. 354 This
docket is an official record and the clerk's entry of a judgment in the docket is evidence of the fact that the writ was issued.3 5 5 Entry of the writ on
the execution docket, however, is not necessary to its validity if some other
3 56
It
document such as a recorded deed from a sheriff's sale is in evidence.
should be noted that one of the purposes of an execution docket is to
establish a specific time when the writ was issued.3 5 7 This method of determining the specific time the writ was issued is further augmented by Rule
636 which requires the officer receiving the writ to specify on the writ the
3 58
hour and day it was received.
The clerk of each court is required to deliver to the judgment creditor an
abstract of the judgment indicating the date, amount and parties to the judgment.35 9 The judgment creditor should then take this abstract to the
county clerk who will record on it the day and hour it is received. 3 6 0 A
distinction between the two records, that of the clerk of court and that of the
county clerk, becomes necessary only in determining the priority of liens of
multiple creditors. The specific time a judgment is recorded by the county
Rule 634 where an individual files a right of property suit claiming property owned
by him in the possession of the judgment debtor. Id. at 641.

352. House v. Robertson, 89 Tex. 681, 686-87, 36 S.W. 251, 252 (1896); Acrey
v. Henslee, 279 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1955, no writ); see Sydnor v. Roberts, 13 Tex. 299, 308 (1855).
353. Dunn v. Ligon, 430 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no
writ); Richburg v. Baldwin, 89 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, writ
dism'd); Kruegel v. Williams, 153 S.W. 903, 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1913, writ

ref'd).

354. TEx. R. Civ. P. 656; see TEx.

REV.

CIv.

STAT.

ANN. art. 5447 (Supp. 1974).

355. Schleicher v. Markward, 61 Tex. 99, 102 (1884); Goggans v. Green, 165 S.W.
2d 928, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1942, no writ).
356.

Holmes v. Coryell, 58 Tex. 680, 686 (1883) Bendy v. Carter, 269 S.W. 1037,

1038 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted).
357. TEX. R. Civ. P. 656.

358. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3785 (1966) which was repealed in part
by Rule 636.
359. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5447 (Supp. 1974).
360. TEx. RE. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 5448 (1958).
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clerk is important since this operates to set. the priority of the lien upon all
the real property of the defendant in the county of recording. 86 1
Unlike the creation of a lien upon real property, a lien upon all of the
judgment debtor's personal property in a particular county is created at the
time such personal property is levied upon by the officer.8 6 2 The officer
receiving the judgment is required to proceed without delay to levy on all
property of the debtor subject to execution within the county. 868 Therefore,
the priority of liens upon the personal property of the debtor depends upon
the time of levy by the officer, not upon the time of filing of the abstract
of judgment with the county clerk. Under Rule 637 the officer is also required to call on the defendant and ask him to point out the property to be
levied upon. Failure of the officer to call on the defendant, however, will
not void a sale or deed to the property. 36 4 Nevertheless, the officer is liable
on his bond for failure to levy on or sell the defendant's property to the extent of the actual loss attributable to his breach of duty. 365
The procedure that the officer must follow in actually levying upon the real
or personal property of the judgment debtor is established by Rule 639.866
The word "levy" means actual or constructive seizure by the officer and the
bringing of the property described in the writ under the control and custody
of the court.8 6 7 An actual taking of a debtor's property in which the debtor
did not have a possessory right may not stand as a legal taking8 68 nor will
361. Tax.

REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.

art. 5449 (1958).

362. Kanaman v. Hubbard, 110 Tex. 560, 563, 222 S.W. 151, 152 (1920); Herndon
v. Cocke, 138 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1940, no writ).
363 TEX. R. Civ. P. 637 states in part that the officer should first call on the defend-

ant and have him point out property to be levied upon and the first levy shall be upon
such designated property until the judgment is satisfied. If no property is designated
the officer may levy upon any property of the defendant subject to execution.
364. Beck v. Avondino, 82 Tex. 314, 18 S.W. 690 (1891); Sharp v. Yniguez, 324
S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, no writ); Borders v. Highsmith, 252
S.W. 270, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1923, writ dism'd).
-365. Fant Milling Co. v. May, 240 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951,
writ ref'd nr.e.); Richardson v. Johnson Layne Coffee Co., 252 S.W. 253, 255 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1923, no writ); Hale v. Bickett, 78 S.W. 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904,

no writ).
366. Tx. R. Civ. P. 639 provides that in order to make a levy on real property
the officer must go upon the property itself and endorse the writ to that effect. To
levy upon personal property the officer must take the property into his possession unless the personal property is of such a nature as to make actual possession impossible.
If the defendant has an interest in personal property, but is not entitled to possession,
the levy is made by giving notice to the person entitled to possession.
367. Wilkinson v. Goree, 18 F.2d 455, 456 (5th Cir. 1927); Voelkel-McLain Co. v.
First Nat'l Bank, 296 S.W. 970, 972 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1927, no writ).
368. Kimbrough v. Bevering, 182 S.W. 403, 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1915,
no writ). But cf. Coulson v. Panhandle Nat'l Bank, 54 F. 855 (5th Cir. 1893). The
sheriff levied on the defendant's nonpossessory one-half interest in a flock of goats
by shearing wool from one-half the flock.
exercise of power under the writ. Id. at 858.

The court upheld this action as a valid
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posting notice of an attempt to levy be sufficient where actual physical possession was possible but not taken.8 6 9 There is an exception, however,
where the property is of such great weight, bulk, and immobility that the
expense of moving would be prohibitive. Where the property of the debtor
falls within the excepted category, the officer must perform some act which,
if not for the immunity furnished by the writ, would constitute a trespass,
such as going on the property, pointing out the property to be levied on and
370
forbidding its removal by the defendant.
Separate requirements have been established for providing notice of the
sale of personal property and real property. Notice of the sale of the personal property of the judgment debtor is provided for in Rule 650. The
time and place of the sale must be posted at the courthouse door of the
county and at the place where the sale is to be made for 10 consecutive
days before the sale is held.3 71 The property itself must be exhibited at the
sale except for stock in a joint stock company or an incorporated company
or where the defendant has an interest in the property without a possessory
right.8 72 If the property is not exhibited at the sale and does not come within
the excepted category, the sale is void.373 The requirements for notice of
the sale of real property are established in Rule 647.37 4 Notice may
369. Osborn v. Paul, 27 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1930, writ
ref'd); Burch v. Mounts, 185 S.W. 889, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1916, writ
ref'd). Possession is "the condition in which not only one's own dealing with the thing
is physically possible, but every other person dealing with it is capable of being excluded." The officer must take the property in an "open, public, and unqualified manner as to appraise everybody that it has been taken in execution." Id. at 892.
370. Portis v. Parker, 8 Tex. 23, 25 (1852); Bryan v. Bridges, 6 Tex. 69, 81 (1851);
Beaurline v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 191 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1945,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Smith v. Harvey, 104 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonio
1937, writ ref'd); Burch v. Mounts, 185 S.W. 889, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1916, writ ref'd); Jones & Nixon v. First State Bank, 140 S.W. 116, 117 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth), af 'd, 106 Tex. 572, 173 S.W. 202 (1915).
371. TEx. R. Civ. P. 650.
372. TEX. R. Civ. P. 649. The personal property of the defendant shall be offered
for sale at the location where it was taken, at the county courthouse door, or at a
place more convenient due to the nature of the property.
373. Gunter & Summerfield v. Cobb, 82 Tex. 598, 606, 17 S.W. 848, 851 (1891);
L.J. Tillery Oil Co. v. Snyder, 42 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931,
no writ); Hopping v. Hicks, 190 S.W. 1119, 1122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1916,
writ ref'd); George R. Dickinson Paper Co. v. Mail Pub. Co., 31 S.W. 1083 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1895, no writ).
374. TEx. R. Civ. P. 647 provides that the time and place of sale will be advertised
in a newspaper published in the county once a week, for 3 consecutive weeks before
the sale. Notice shall contain a statement of authority, time of levy, and time and
place of sale, a description of the property giving the number of acres, original survey,
locality in the county and the common name. If the price of publication exceeds that
amount authorized to be spent, the officer shall post written notice in five public places
in the county, including the courthouse door, for at least 20 successive days before
the sale. The officer shall also give the defendant, his agent or attorney written notice
either in person or by mail.
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be published in any newspaper published in the county and it is not necessary that the newspaper be one of general circulation.37 5 If improper nofice has been given, the defendant must make a timely objection or his
right to notice will be deemed waivedAT0 The failure of the officer to give
proper notice merely renders the sale voidable and not void, subject to the
8 77
defendant's timely objection.
Once proper notcie has been given to the judgment debtor, real property will be sold at the courthouse door of the county or at the place where
the property is located if so ordered by the court.3 78 If the execution sale is
not made at the time, place or in the manner required by law, the sale is
void.. 7 9 A sale of land by a sheriff outside his county is void even if the
land outside the county is contiguous to land owned by the debtor within the
county.380 A defective execution may be amended only before a sale; any
381
sale made under an execution amended after the sale is void.
Certain irregularities, such as failure to mention the proceeding which revived a judgment under which the sale in question was held, are deemed
harmless errors which will not render the sale void.38 2 Additionally, imperfections in the levy such as an insufficient description of the land sold
may be cured by an accurate description in the sheriff's deed given at the
sale of the land.38 3 A purchaser at an execution sale is not bound and his
purchase is not affected by irregularities committed by the officer making
the sale as long as these irregularities are without the knowledge of the purchaser.3 84 If the officer sells without authority, no title can pass, but if he
fails to follow the authority he possesses, the title will pass and the in3 85
jured party must pursue his remedy against the sheriff.
375. Saylors v. Wood, 135 Tex. 267, 270, 140 S.W.2d 164, 165 (1940).

376. Morris v. Hastings, 70 Tex. 26, 28, 7 S.W. 649, 650 (1888).
377. Polk v. Holland Hypotheek Bank, 66 S.W.2d 1112, 1116 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1933, no writ); Holt v. Holt, 59 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-

kana 1933, writ ref'd); Hodges v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co., 44 S.W.2d 400,
402 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1931, no writ).
378. TEX. R. Civ. P. 646(a).

379. Moody's Heirs v. Moeller, 72 Tex. 635, 638, 10 S.W. 727, 729 (1889); Sinclair
v. Stanley, 64 Tex. 67, 72 (1885); Casseday v. Norris, 49 Tex. 613, 618 (1878); Grace
v. Garnett, 38 Tex. 157, 159 (1873); Howard v. North, 5 Tex. 290, 309-10 (1849);

Neblett v. Slosson, 223 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
380. Short v. Hepburn, 75 F. 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1896).
381. Morris v. Balkham, 75 Tex. 111, 113, 12 S.W. 970, 971 (1889). The judgment
was obtained against H.W. Van Hogan and execution was issued against William Van

Hogan. The court refused to allow the purchaser to amend the writ after the sale.
382. Berly v. Sias, 152 Tex. 176, 179, 255 S.W.2d 505, 507 (1953).

383. Henderson v. Boyer, 51 Tex. 336, 345-46 (1879); Downs v. Wagnon, 66 S.W.
2d 777, 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933, writ dism'd).
384. Howard v. North, 5 Tex. 145, 154 (1849); Stone v. King, 154 S.W.2d 521,
523 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
385. Howard v. North, 5 Tex. 145, 153 (1849); Stone v. King, 154 S.W.2d 521,
523 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
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There is some conflict as to whether or not inadequacy of price will void
a sale. For example, in Graves v. Griffin3 8 6 land was appraised at $2,200
and sold for $81. Since this was the only irregularity alleged by the judgment debtor, the court refused to avoid the sale for mere inadequacy of
price.38 7 In Moore v. Miller,38 8 however, it was held that the showing
of slight additional facts of fraud, irregularity or other circumstances calculated to prevent the property from being sold at its reasonable value, coupled
with inadequacy of price, would be sufficient to allow a court to use its
equity powers to avoid a sale.38 9 The sale of an oil and gas lease worth
$3,400 for $50 was avoided by the court in Saylors v. Wood3 90 because the
defendant proved he was ready and willing to pay the indebtedness at the
time of the sale. 391
Where a defendant's land is in a rural location he may divide the property
into 50 acre lots and designate the order of sale.3 92 This is a protective device afforded the defendant to avoid an excessive levy but his failure to take
advantage of it offers no grounds to enjoin the sale. 39 3 If, however, the
defendant avails himself of this option and the officer conducting the sale
fails to sell the land in the designated lots, the sale is void. 8 94 Likewise, a
defendant who owns land subject to execution within a town or city is permitted to have each tract or parcel sold separately unless the improvements
on such lots prohibit their separate sale.39 5 Because this is an optional and
not a mandatory procedure, the failure to sell the lots separately or to divide
the land into lots where the land was easily separated is an irregularity
396
which makes the sale only voidable.
386. 228 S.W. 913 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted).
387. Id. at 915; accord, Allen v. Stephanes, 18 Tex. 590, 598 (1857); Sharp v.
Yniguez, 324 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, no writ); see Grace
v. Gamett, 38 Tex. 155, 160 (1873).
388. 155 S.W. (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1913, writ ref'd).
389. Id. at 576; accord, Allen v. Stephanes, 18 Tex. 590, 603 (1857); see Peters
v. Rice, 157 S.W. 1181, 1182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1913, writ ref'd) (land appraised
at between $12,000 and $15,000 sold for $40).
390. 120 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App.--El Paso 1938), aff'd, 135 Tex. 267, 140 S.W.
2d 164 (1940).
391. Id. at 838; accord, House v. Robertson, 89 Tex. 681, 687, 36 S.W. 251, 252
(1896); Taul v. Wright, 45 Tex. 388, 394 (1876); Nance v. Currey, 257 S.W.2d 847,
849 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, no writ) (sale of land valued at $175,000 for
$2500).
392. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3807 (1966).
393. Chandler v. Riley, 210 S.W. 716, 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1919, no writ);
Dickinson v. Comstock, 199 S.W. 863, 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1917, no writ).
But see Sharp v. Yniguez, 324 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, no
writ); Chandler v. Young, 216 S.W. 485, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1919, no writ)
(homestead exemption prevails even if it is not designated by the defendant).
394. Mills v. Pitts, 121 Tex. 196, 201, 48 S.W.2d 941, 942 (1932).
395. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3806 (1966).
396. Nance v. Currey, 257 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, no writ);
Peters v. Rice, 157 S.W. 1181, 1182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1913, writ ref'd); Moore
v. Miller, 155 S.W. 573, 577 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1913, writ ref'd).
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The purchaser at a judgment sale acquires all right, title, interest and
claim which the judgment debtor had in the property being sold. 9 7 This
simply means that a purchaser can acquire no greater title than the judgment debtor held at the time of the sale. 98 Additionally, because the deed
which the purchaser receives amounts to more than a quitclaim deed, he is
in effect a bona fide purchaser as to possible defects in the title399 such
as unrecorded claims against the property. Although the statute specifies
that the purchaser receives all of the defendant's estate, this has been interpreted to mean only that estate which was levied upon and appeared on the
officer's endorsement to the writ.400 A purchaser at a judgment sale is also
deemed innocent and without notice to the same extent he would have been
40 1
innocent and without notice had the debtor sold the property voluntarily.
For example, had there been an unrecorded executed contract for the sale
of the property which was purchased at a judgment sale, the purchaser
would take the property over the unrecorded contract.4 02 The purchaser is
charged only with notice of the defects appearing upon the face of the writ
of execution or those discovered from an examination of the judgment on
403
which the sale is based.
If the purchaser at a judgment sale is unable or unwilling to pay the price
bid, he becomes liable to the defendant for 20 percent of the value of the
property as a penalty and he is also liable to the defendant for any loss suffered in the subsequent sale. 40 4 The penalty and liability for damages do not
apply where the sheriff refuses to accept tender of payment 405 or when
the property is taken away from the sheriff after the bid was made but before the sale is consummated. 40 6 If there is any surplus realized from the
397, TEx REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3816 (1966).
398. Triangle Supply Co. v. Fletcher, 408 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Jensen v. Wilkinson, 133 S.W.2d 982, 984 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); Robinson v. Monning Dry Goods, 211 S.W.
535, 537 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1919, no writ); Lippincott v. Taylor, 135 S.W.
1070, 1072 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, writ ref'd).
399. Ward v. League, 24 S.W. 986, 988 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ).
400. Riordan v. Britton, 69 Tex. 198, 204, 7 S.W. 50, 53 (1887); Smoot v. Woods,
363 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
401. TEx. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 3818 (1966).
402. Linn v. Le Compte, 47 Tex. 440 (1877).
403. Spence v. State Nat'l Bank, 294 S.W. 618, 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1927),
aII'd, 5 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928); accord, Harvey v. Humphreys, 178 S.W.
2d 733, 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Love v. Allday Supply Co., 106 S.W.2d 831, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1937, no writ); Lissner v. State
Mortgage Corp., 29 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1930, writ dism'd).
404. TEx. R. Civ. P. 652.
405. Cameron v. Saatboff, 342 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio),
aff'd, 162 Tex. 124, 345 S.W.2d 281 (1961).
406. Archenhold Co. v. Schaefer, 205 S.W. 139, 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1918,
no writ); Borden v. Fahey, 120 S.W. 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, writ ref'd); Towell
v. Smith, 55 S.W. 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ).
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sale over the amount of the judgment, it is immediately paid to the judg40 7
ment debtor.
Once a judgment becomes final it has an initial life of 10 years. If within
10 years after the judgment was initially rendered by the court the judgment creditor fails to execute on the judgment, the judgment becomes
barred. 40 8 If, however, the creditor does have the execution issue on the
judgment before the 10-year period expires, the judgment will remain effective for another 10 years beginning from the date the execution was issued by the court. 40 9 This simple procedure gives the judgment creditor an
inexpensive remedy to keep his judgment alive and prolong its life indefinitely. 410 The judgment creditor, knowing that the judgment debtor has no
property on the tax rolls of the specified county, may deliver the writ to the
sheriff with the request that it be returned "nulla bona" in order to keep
41
the judgment alive. '
Another method of prolonging the life of a judgment is provided by article 5532. A judgment may be extended for a 10-year period by the
judgment creditor if he petitions the court which issued the judgment for a
4 12
writ of scire Jacias or by bringing another action on the original debt.
Additionally, no judgment may become barred while it is being appealed since

an appeal deprives the judgment of the necessary finality to sustain a writ
of execution.

413

There appears to be an inconsistency between article 5532 and article
3773 on the issue of dormancy. Originally, article 3773 provided that a
judgment became dormant after 12 months and could be revived, for the
remainder of the 10-year period from the date the judgment was rendered
414
by the court, only by the use of the procedures prescribed by article 5532.
In 1933, however, article 3773 was amended to read that "if no execution

is issued within 10 years after rendition of judgment the judgment shall be407. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3827 (1966).
408. Zummo v. Cotham, 137 Tex. 517, 155 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1941,
opinion adopted); Grant Lumber Co. v. Bell, 302 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1957, writ ref'd); Arroyo Colorado Nav. Dist. v. Young, 285 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.

Civ. App.-Austin 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
409. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2451 (1971); TEX. REV. Clv STAT. ANN. art.
3773 (1966).
410. General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 93, 138 S.W.2d 531, 536
(1940).
411. Spencer & Co. v. Harris, 171 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943,
writ ref'd). This is merely a time saving device which allows the creditor to maintain
his judgment without having the sheriff make a useless search of the county for property of the defendant.

412. TEX. REV.CIV. STAT. ANNI. art. 5532 (1958).
413. McDonald v. Ayres, 242 S.W. 192, 195 (Tex. Comnm'n App. 1922, idgmt
adopted).
414. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5532 (1958); see Note, 31 TExAs L. REV. 73,
74 (1952).
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come dormant . . .,,.415 The effect of this amendment was to destroy the
concept of dormancy in Texas, despite the still-existing language in article
5532 to the effect that a judgment is domant if no execution has issued
within 12 months after rendition of the judgment. With the changes in article 3773, today a judgment in Texas is alive for 10 years and at any
time during that 10-year period may be extended for another 10 years by
having execution reissue or by the use of a writ of scire facias or by an action on the debt. 416 This position, adopted by the Texarkana Court of Civil
Appeals in Cox v. Nelson,4 17 was expressly approved by the Supreme
Court in Sanders v. Harder.418 Therefore, if the creditor fails to have his
judgment revived by some method within 10 years from the date it is ren41
dered by the court, then the recovery on that judgment is barred forever. 9
POST-JUDGMENT DISCOVERY
Although the discussion of the writ of execution points out that the issuance of a writ is the final action of a lawsuit, an attorney may find that
despite his diligence in obtaining a valid issuance of the writ, he may still
have to face the unhappy prospect of an unsatisfied judgment. This may
occur when property subject to execution cannot be discovered and the writ is
returned unsatisfied. The judgment creditor's attorney must then determine
whether to withdraw from the contest with only a hollow victory in the form
of a valid, but unsatisfied judgment, or to continue the contest further by
engaging in post-judgment discovery proceedings.
Post-judgment proceedings begin with the filing of an abstract of judgment with the trial court. 420 The abstract operates a a lien upon real property and should be filed in any county where the judgment debtor possesses
42 1
property or may acquire such property in the future. A writ of execution
should then be issued, and the results of the execution will determine whether
or not further post-judgment proceedings are necessary. If there is prop415. TEx.

REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3773 (1966).
416. The judgment lien also maintains its vitality and priority. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5449 (1958).
417. 223 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1949, writ ref'd); the court
rejected a contention that article 5532 should prevail over article 3773 and stated that
the opposite effect should be given where the two articles are in conflict. The court
points out the intent of the legislature in amending 3773 was to avoid the unnecessary
and useless expense of the revival methods set out in 5532. Id. at 86.
418. 148 Tex. 593, 595, 227 S.W.2d 206, 207 (1950) wherein the court stated: "Under the holding in the recent case of Cox v. Nelson . . . it appears that the judgment
had not become dormant ....
"
419. Wilson, The Dormant Judgment in Texas, 2 BAYLOR L. REV. 421, 427 (1950);
Comment, Perpetuatingthe Force of Judgments and Judgment Liens in Texas, 29 TExAs
L. REv. 530, 536 (1951).
420. See Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5447, 5449, 5450, and 5451 (1958).
421. TEx. R. Cxv. P. 621.
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erty upon which the sheriff may execute to satisfy the judgment, discovery
proceedings will not be necessary. The writ, however, is often returned
unsatisfied, 422 and the judgment creditor must use certain discovery methods
to find the debtor's assets.
POST-JUDGMENT DISCOVERY PRIOR TO RULE

621a

Prior to 1971 a judgment creditor with an unsatisfied execution was
limited to the use of a bill of discovery pursuant to Rule 737 in his attempt to locate assets upon which he could execute. A bill of discovery
used after a judgment has been rendered is often cumbersome, costly and
ineffective because venue of the original suit does not control. 423 An independent suit must therefore be filed, 424 the debtor being entitled on a proper
plea of privilege 425 to have a hearing on the bill transferred to the county of
426
his residence.
Although a bill of discovery may be used after a final judgment, 427 it is
apparent that such was not its intended use. 428 The methods of discovery provided by the bill are limited to oral interrogatories before the court
and the taking of the judgment debtor's oral deposition. 429 These limitations,
the potential change of venue and the inherent costs which the judgment
creditor is forced to incur in initiating a new suit, place the judgment debtor
in a significantly favorable position in the proceedings. Judgments are often awarded to the plaintiff, but remain unsatisfied because the procedure
necessary to discover the defendant's leviable assets is too burdensome for
the plaintiff to undertake. To aid in the enforcement of judgments, the
Texas Supreme Court has promulgated Rule 621 a, effective January 1, 1971,
which authorizes the use of any discovery proceeding otherwise permitted
48 0
by the statutes.
422. The sheriff will return the writ stating what he has done in pursuance of the

requirements of the writ. TEx. R. Civ. P. 654. If the writ is returned "unsatisfied"
it will state that the judgment debtor has no property subject to execution.
423. Emmons v. Creditor's Fin. Servs., 492 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1973, no writ).
424. Loomis, Use of Rule 621a, 35 TEx. B.J. 1149, 1150 (1972).

425. Tax. R. Civ. P. 86, 87, 88, and 89.
426. Emmons v. Creditor's Fin. Servs., 492 S.W.2d 363, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1973, no writ).
427. Id. at 365.
428. Loomis, Use of Rule 621a, 35 TEX. B.J. 1149, 1150 (1972).

429. TEx. R. Civ. P. 737.
430. Whereas Rule 737 is limited to oral examination, Rule 621a provides for the
use of written interrogatories, eliminating the necessity of the judgment debtor's personal appearance before the court. Discovery proceedings permitted by statute are
TEx. R. Civ. P. 186a:
Any Party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition
upon oral examination or written questions for the purpose of discovery. ...
Tax. R. Civ. P. 167:
Upon motion . . . showing good cause . . . the court . . . may order any party:
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621a

The discovery proceedings provided by Rule 621a have two distinct advantages over those provided by the bill of discovery under Rule 737.
First, Rule 621 a provides that the post-judgment proceedings may be brought
under the same suit in which the judgment was rendered, therefore eliminating the change of venue problem and the lengthy time period between the
rendering of the judgment and the recovery by the plaintiff. Second, any
method of discovery which may be used in pretrial proceedings may also
be used in post-judgment actions. Under Rule 737 answers are limited to
oral depositions and the appearance of the debtor before the court. Rule
621a, however, provides for the use of written interrogatories by a judgment
creditor, thereby enabling the discovery to be made more quickly and efficiently as there is no immediate need for a court appearance, court
stenographer, etc. The use of 621a is governed by Rule 168, which establishes the basic requirements for the use of written interrogatories, 431 and
by Rules 21a and 21b, which provide the requirements for notice to the
4 2
other party.
Procedure under Rule 621a is relatively simple, especially if the debtor is
receptive to the discovery. Immediately after the rendition of the judgment,43 3 the judgment creditor should submit written interrogatories to the
(1) To produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing . . . of
: (a) any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain, or are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of, evidence material to any matter involved in the action ....
TEX. R. Civ. P. 168:
At any time after a party has made appearance in the cause, or time therefor
elapsed, any other party may serve upon such party written interrogatories to be
answered by the party served. ...
431. The basic requirements for the use of written interrogatories are:
[Alny other party may serve upon such party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served ....
Whenever a party is represented by an attorney, service of interrogatories and
answers to interrogatories shall be made on the attorney unless delivery to the
party himself is ordered by the court. True copies of the interrogatories and of
any answers shall be served on all other parties or their attorneys at the time that
any interrogatories or answers are served, and a true copy of each shall be
promptly filed in the clerk's office together with proof of service thereof under the
*

. .

provisions of Rules 21a and 21b.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.
432. The basic requirements for notice to other parties are:
Every notice required by these rules . . . may be served by delivering a copy
. . . to the party to be served, or his duly authorized agent, or his attorney . . .
either in person or by registered mail .

. .

.

Service by mail shall be complete

upon deposit of the paper, enclosed in a post-paid, properly addressed wrapper, in a
post office or official depository.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a. Additionally, TEX. R. Civ. P. 21b provides that "such notice or
service may also be had by certified mail."
433. It has been suggested that interrogatories should be served before the judgment
is finalized. Loomis, Use of Rule 621a, 35 TEX. B.J. 1149, 1150 (1972).
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judgment debtor. 434 If the interrogatories are mailed, which is usually the
most convenient method for the creditor, the debtor is allowed 13 days to
object to them 435 and at least 18 days in which to answer. 43 6 If the answers
are not received or objected to within the appropriate time limits, the creditor should submit to the court a motion to compel answers. If the motion
is granted, a hearing will be set and the judgment debtor then has the opportunity to present his reasons for failing to answer. 437 If the debtor refuses
to comply with the order, the creditor may, by use of a subpoena, compel
the debtor to appear and produce records which will aid the creditor in his
discovery. 438 If the debtor appears but refuses to answer or produce the desired items, he may be charged with contempt. 439 Should the debtor not
appear for the hearing, an order of arrest and attachment 440 is prepared,
ordering the sheriff to bring the debtor before the court where he will answer
for contempt. 44 1 The debtor may then either answer the interrogatories or
refuse to answer and accept instead a fine or jail sentence. If the debtor
answers the creditor's interrogatories, the creditor can use the answers to
pursue collection of his judgment in ancillary proceedings such as garnishment and attachment. If the debtor steadfastly refuses to answer, the credi-

434. TEx. R. Civ. P. 168. If the judgment debtor has retained his counsel, service
of the interrogatories and answers to interrogatories shall be made upon the attorney
unless delivery to the debtor is ordered by the court. Id.
435. The 13-day period is calculated by combining the provisions of TEX. R. Civ. P.
168 and 21a which are as follows:
Within 10 days after service of interrogatories a party may serve written objections
thereto together with a notice of hearing the objections at the earliest practicable
time.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 168.
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper
upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, three days shall
be added to the prescribed period.
TEx. R. Crv. P. 21a.
436. This 18-day period is calculated by combining the provisions of TEX. R. Civ.
P. 168 and 21a concerning the time allotted for answering interrogatories. Rule 168
provides:
The party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of
the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within the time specified
by the party serving the interrogatories which specified time shall not be less than
15 days after the service of the interrogatories, unless the court, on motion and notice and for good cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time.
437. TEx. R. Civ. P. 215a.
438. TEX. R. Crv. P. 201.
439. TEx. R. Civ. P. 215a(b).
440. The order for attachment is prepared for the court's signature and provides:
Attachment issue herein for the said (party) directed to any sheriff or
constable within the State of Texas requiring such officer at the time of the execution thereof to serve upon the said
(party) a certified copy of this
order and to arrest the said
(party) and bring him personally before the
court (at an appointed time) (or instanter) to answer for said contempt against
the court.
Loomis, Use of Rule 621a, 35 TEX. B.J. 1149, 1150 (1972).
441. TEx. R. Civ. P. 215a.
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tor is in no better nor worse position than he was when he received the
442
favorable judgment at the principal trial.
The debtor is protected from an unreasonable use of the discovery process in that he is granted two opportunities to refuse to answer: one after the
issuance of the original interrogatories, and another subsequent to the court's
granting of the motion to compel answers. As Rule 621a provides that the
creditor may use discovery in any manner "provided by the rules," the
debtor is protected by these rules and the creditor must abide by them. 443
A judgment creditor, previously limited to a bill of discovery, may now
use written interrogatories in his efforts to secure collection of the judgment
he has been awarded. He does not have to initiate a new suit and thereby
avoids the costs and delays inherent in a bill of discovery. These two advantages may ultimately result in the elimination of the bill of discovery as
an element of post-judgment proceedings.
It is apparent that the procedure necessary for the creditor to discover
leviable assets of the debtor can still be lengthy if the debtor refuses to answer the interrogatories. The creditor must decide whether he wishes to
pursue the matter any further than the filing of an abstract of judgment and
issuing the original writ of execution. The amount of the judgment will
certainly influence this decision, but the creditor should realize that he can
only profit from the use of the interrogatories, a factor which could call for
their use as an automatic part of the creditor's trial procedure.
CONCLUSION
In this symposium the authors have presented a review of available Texas
post-judgment remedies. Our primary goal has been to assist the practicing
attorney in the collection and satisfaction of otherwise unsatisfied judgments.
Successful post-judgment collection is dependent upon a strict adherence to
statutory and judicial requisites. The symposium has traced these requirements and placed them into orderly perspective for the practitioner.
Because the nation's economy is significantly based upon credit, it is
essential to appreciate the importance of collection devices. In Texas, however, few comprehensive articles have considered the practical methods of
pursuing post-judgment remedies. We hope to have generated a better understanding of this specific field of creditors' rights.
442. Tax. R. Crv. P. 168, 170(c) and 215a(a) make provisions that reasonable expenses may be awarded to the party who has to take additional steps to recover his
judgment because of the defendant-debtor's refusal to answer. The court under these
rules may also grant attorney's fees.
443. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 168, 186b.
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